diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index af5e307..94d0ff6 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ Layered prompt-injection / approval-fatigue defenses. Full reference: [docs/SECU
 - **Pipe-fed xargs composition** (`internal/danger/classifier.go`) — when a pipeline's sink is `xargs` invoking a destructive/system verb, statically determinable upstream payloads (`echo`/`printf` args) are composed onto the inner command before classification (`echo "/" | xargs rm -rf` → `destructive`, like `rm -rf /`); when the payload is not statically determinable (`cat file | …`, `find … | …`, `$VARS`) and the inner verb is dangerous-capable (`rm`, `shred`, `dd`, `chmod`, `chown`, `mkfs.*`, …), the pipeline fails closed as `unknown` (deny-by-default).
 - **Root-level mutation targets** (`internal/danger/classifier.go`) — `ClassifyPath("/")` is `system_write`, so `chmod -R 777 /`, `chattr -R +i /`, and `mv / /tmp/x` prompt instead of falling through to auto-allowed `local_write` (parity with `chown -R`). `chattr` is handled with the same operand scan as `chmod`.
 - **Git data-loss verbs gated** (`internal/danger/classifier.go`) — `git clean -f*` (unless `-n`/`--dry-run`), `git reset --hard`, `git checkout -f`/`--`/`./…`, `git restore` (worktree), `git branch -D` / `--delete --force`, `git stash drop`/`clear`, and `git reflog expire` classify as `system_write` (prompt-by-default) instead of `safe`, so an injected payload cannot wipe a working tree with zero friction.
+- **`gh` classified like `git`** (`internal/danger/classifier.go`) — the GitHub CLI is in `networkPrefixes`; every real subcommand (`gh pr`, `gh api`, `gh repo delete`, …) contacts the GitHub API and classifies as `network_egress`, while meta invocations (`gh --version`, `gh help`, `gh completion`, bare `gh`) stay `safe`. `-R`/`--repo` consumes its value token so it is not mistaken for the subcommand (parity with `git -C`).
 - **WebSocket CSRF token** (`cmd/odek/serve.go`) — `odek serve` issues a random 256-bit token at startup and requires it on `/ws` via cookie, `X-Odek-Ws-Token` header, or `odek.<token>` subprotocol. The token is no longer embedded in every `GET /` response; it is only delivered when the request includes the correct `?token=` query parameter (Jupyter-style), and a non-loopback bind prints a loud warning. The localhost origin check remains as defense-in-depth.
 - **SSRF / DNS-rebinding dial guard** (`cmd/odek/ssrf_guard.go` + `internal/danger/classifier.go`) — `browser`, `http_batch`, and `web_search` resolve hostnames at dial time and refuse internal IPs (loopback, RFC1918, RFC4193, link-local, RFC 6598 CGNAT `100.64.0.0/10`, RFC 2544 benchmark `198.18.0.0/15`, and unspecified), then pin the dial to the validated IP. Operator-configured backends (e.g. `web_search.base_url`) are added to an allowlist so container-internal services such as SearXNG remain reachable.
 - **SSRF guard proxy refusal** (`cmd/odek/ssrf_guard.go`) — when `HTTP(S)_PROXY` is set, the transport would dial the proxy instead of the target and the dial guard would only validate the proxy address. `ssrfGuardedTransport` detects an active proxy, logs a warning, and refuses the request so SSRF protection is not silently voided.
diff --git a/internal/danger/classifier.go b/internal/danger/classifier.go
index 5b61bac..57d03f3 100644
--- a/internal/danger/classifier.go
+++ b/internal/danger/classifier.go
@@ -836,6 +836,9 @@ var networkPrefixes = map[string]bool{
 	"curl": true, "wget": true, "scp": true, "rsync": true,
 	"nc": true, "ncat": true, "ssh": true, "sftp": true,
 	"ftp": true, "tftp": true, "telnet": true, "git": true,
+	// gh is the GitHub CLI: like git's remote-contacting subcommands, every
+	// real gh subcommand talks to the GitHub API (see isNetworkEgress).
+	"gh": true,
 	// reverse-shell / tunnelling relays
 	"socat": true, "rclone": true,
 	// DNS lookups double as exfiltration channels
@@ -2437,6 +2440,34 @@ func isNetworkEgress(first string, tokens []string) bool {
 		}
 		return false
 	}
+	// gh subcommands inherently contact the GitHub API — the same class as
+	// git's remote-contacting subcommands. Only meta invocations (help,
+	// completion, version queries) stay local and fall through to Safe.
+	if first == "gh" {
+		skipNext := false
+		for _, tok := range tokens[1:] {
+			if skipNext {
+				skipNext = false
+				continue
+			}
+			if strings.HasPrefix(tok, "-") {
+				// -R/--repo consumes the following token as its value; it must
+				// not be mistaken for the subcommand (parity with git -C).
+				if tok == "-R" || tok == "--repo" {
+					skipNext = true
+				}
+				continue
+			}
+			// First non-flag token is the subcommand.
+			switch tok {
+			case "help", "completion", "version":
+				return false
+			}
+			return true
+		}
+		// Bare gh or flags only (e.g. gh --version, gh --help).
+		return false
+	}
 	// rsync with remote target (contains :)
 	if first == "rsync" {
 		for _, tok := range tokens[1:] {
diff --git a/internal/danger/classifier_test.go b/internal/danger/classifier_test.go
index df801f7..41ec53c 100644
--- a/internal/danger/classifier_test.go
+++ b/internal/danger/classifier_test.go
@@ -198,6 +198,44 @@ func TestClassify_NetworkEgress_GitPushNeedsRemote(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestClassify_NetworkEgress_Gh(t *testing.T) {
+	// gh gets the same classification as git: every real subcommand contacts
+	// the GitHub API (network egress); meta invocations stay local (safe).
+	tests := []struct {
+		cmd string
+		cls RiskClass
+	}{
+		{"gh pr view 123", NetworkEgress},
+		{"gh pr merge 125 --squash", NetworkEgress},
+		{"gh repo clone owner/repo", NetworkEgress},
+		{"gh repo delete owner/repo --yes", NetworkEgress},
+		{"gh api /user", NetworkEgress},
+		{"gh auth login", NetworkEgress},
+		{"gh release delete v1.0.0 --yes", NetworkEgress},
+		{"/usr/local/bin/gh pr checks", NetworkEgress},
+		// -R/--repo consumes the following token as its value; it must not be
+		// mistaken for the subcommand (parity with git -C).
+		{"gh -R owner/repo pr list", NetworkEgress},
+		{"gh --repo owner/repo pr list", NetworkEgress},
+
+		{"gh", Safe},
+		{"gh --version", Safe},
+		{"gh --help", Safe},
+		{"gh help", Safe},
+		{"gh help pr", Safe},
+		{"gh completion -s bash", Safe},
+		{"gh -R owner/repo help", Safe},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.cmd, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := Classify(tt.cmd)
+			if got != tt.cls {
+				t.Errorf("Classify(%q) = %s, want %s", tt.cmd, got, tt.cls)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestClassify_CodeExecution_Commands(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		cmd string