diff --git a/dstack/verifier/README.md b/dstack/verifier/README.md
index 8529dc1f6..4572e4daf 100644
--- a/dstack/verifier/README.md
+++ b/dstack/verifier/README.md
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ against the returned evidence.
   "is_valid": true,
   "details": {
     "quote_verified": true,
-    "event_log_verified": true,  // See "Verification Process" for semantics
+    "event_log_verified": true,  // app identity decoded; see "Verification Process"
     "os_image_hash_verified": true,
     "acpi_tables_verified": true,         // true only when TDX ACPI table contents are verified
     "os_image_is_dev": false,             // true=dev image, false=prod, null=unknown/N/A
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ $ curl -s -d @quote.json localhost:8080/verify | jq
 The verifier performs the following verification steps:
 
 1. **Quote Verification**: Validates the platform quote using the platform verifier: DCAP for TDX, AMD SNP report verification for SEV-SNP, NSM for Nitro Enclaves, and AWS NitroTPM attestation-document verification for EC2 NitroTPM.
-2. **Event Log Verification**: Replays event logs to ensure RTMR/PCR values match and extracts app information. For RTMR3 and AWS NitroTPM PCR14 launch measurements, both the digest and payload integrity are verified. For TDX RTMR 0-2 boot-time measurements, only the digests are verified; the payload content is not validated as dstack does not define semantics for these payloads.
+2. **Event Log Verification**: Decodes app information (`app_id`, `compose_hash`, ...) from evidence bound to the quote and reports it as `event_log_verified`. On dstack TDX, GCP TDX and AWS NitroTPM it is read from the runtime event log, whose digests and payloads step 1 already replayed against the quoted register (RTMR3, plus TPM PCR14 on GCP; PCR14 on NitroTPM), so a replay mismatch fails quote verification. SEV-SNP has no runtime event log and takes it from `mr_config`, bound through HOST_DATA; Nitro Enclaves derive it from the PCRs. The RTMR 0-2 entries of a TDX event log are not replayed: on dstack TDX those registers are verified in step 3 against measurements recomputed from the OS image, which does not depend on the host's event log, and dstack defines no semantics for their payloads.
 3. **OS Image Hash Verification**:
    - Treats `vm_config` and any attached measurement material as untrusted inputs until they are bound to the hardware quote
    - For the full-image TDX path, downloads or loads the image identified by `os_image_hash`, checks the image checksum manifest, uses dstack-mr to compute expected MRTD/RTMR0-2, and compares them against the verified measurements from the quote
diff --git a/dstack/verifier/src/types.rs b/dstack/verifier/src/types.rs
index d9d71442b..5d37d9e15 100644
--- a/dstack/verifier/src/types.rs
+++ b/dstack/verifier/src/types.rs
@@ -79,13 +79,25 @@ impl PolicyBootInfo {
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize)]
 pub struct VerificationDetails {
     pub quote_verified: bool,
-    /// Indicates that the event log was verified against the quote.
+    /// Indicates that the app identity was decoded from evidence bound to the
+    /// quote.
     ///
-    /// For RTMR3 (runtime measurements), both the digest and payload integrity are verified
-    /// by replaying the event log and comparing against the quote. For RTMR 0-2 (boot-time
-    /// measurements), only the digests are verified through replay comparison with the quote;
-    /// the payload content is not validated. dstack does not define semantics for RTMR 0-2
-    /// event log payloads.
+    /// On dstack TDX, GCP TDX and AWS NitroTPM that evidence is the runtime
+    /// event log, already replayed during quote verification against RTMR3
+    /// (plus TPM PCR14 on GCP) or PCR14 on NitroTPM, so a replay mismatch fails
+    /// `quote_verified` rather than this flag. Digests and payloads are both
+    /// covered, because `app_id`, `compose_hash` and the rest are read out of
+    /// the payloads. SEV-SNP has no runtime event log and takes the identity
+    /// from `mr_config`, bound through HOST_DATA; Nitro Enclave derives it from
+    /// the PCRs.
+    ///
+    /// It says nothing about the RTMR 0-2 entries a TDX event log carries;
+    /// nothing replays them. On dstack TDX those registers are verified by
+    /// comparing the quoted values against measurements recomputed from the OS
+    /// image (see `os_image_hash_verified`), which does not depend on the
+    /// host's event log. The TDX lite path only reads the three named ACPI
+    /// digests from it and requires them to match the recomputed ones; dstack
+    /// defines no semantics for the other payloads.
     pub event_log_verified: bool,
     pub os_image_hash_verified: bool,
     /// Indicates that TDX ACPI table contents were verified.