diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index bcc849196..b77e1473c 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -188,6 +188,13 @@ module uid even when the module sits under a directory that uid cannot traverse
 immune to the logical-path-versus-real-cwd skew a followed in-tree directory
 symlink would otherwise introduce.
 
+When a sender receives a `--files-from` list in the default symlink mode, the
+source base remains the operator's choice but each path selected by the list is
+checked with the ownership walk. A trusted ancestor symlink may still be
+followed; with `--confine-root` its resolved target must also remain under that
+root. The final content open remains `O_NOFOLLOW`, so a list entry cannot turn a
+leaf symlink into a file read.
+
 ### Path resolution
 
 `secure_relative_open()` resolves a path with a single portable mechanism on
diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c
index 9276c65fc..17ad5a57d 100644
--- a/flist.c
+++ b/flist.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ extern int recurse;
 extern int use_qsort;
 extern int xfer_dirs;
 extern int filesfrom_fd;
+extern char *files_from;
 extern int one_file_system;
 extern int copy_devices;
 extern int copy_dirlinks;
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ extern int prune_empty_dirs;
 extern int copy_links;
 extern int copy_unsafe_links;
 extern int insecure_links;
+extern int filesfrom_owner_walk_override;
 extern int protocol_version;
 extern int sanitize_paths;
 extern int munge_symlinks;
@@ -230,27 +232,250 @@ static int scan_dirfd = -1;
 static const char *scan_dir_prefix;
 static int scan_dir_prefix_len;
 
+struct sender_source_root {
+	struct sender_source_root *next;
+	dev_t dev;
+	ino_t ino;
+	char path[1];
+};
+
+static struct sender_source_root *sender_source_roots;
+static struct sender_source_root *sender_source_root_fd_owner;
+static int sender_source_root_fd = -1;
+
+static int sender_source_full_path(const char *path, char *full, size_t full_size)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (*path == '/')
+		len = strlcpy(full, path, full_size);
+	else
+		len = pathjoin(full, full_size, curr_dir, path);
+	if (len >= full_size) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	clean_fname(full, CFN_COLLAPSE_DOT_DOT_DIRS | CFN_DROP_TRAILING_DOT_DIR);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void remember_sender_source_root(const char *path, const STRUCT_STAT *st)
+{
+	struct sender_source_root *root;
+	char full[MAXPATHLEN];
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (sender_source_full_path(path, full, sizeof full) < 0)
+		overflow_exit("remember_sender_source_root");
+	len = strlen(full);
+
+	for (root = sender_source_roots; root; root = root->next) {
+		if (strcmp(root->path, full) == 0)
+			return;
+	}
+	root = (struct sender_source_root *)new_array(char, sizeof *root + len);
+	root->next = sender_source_roots;
+	root->dev = st->st_dev;
+	root->ino = st->st_ino;
+	memcpy(root->path, full, len + 1);
+	sender_source_roots = root;
+}
+
+static void remember_sender_source_arg(const char *path, const STRUCT_STAT *st)
+{
+	STRUCT_STAT parent_st;
+	char full[MAXPATHLEN], *slash;
+
+	if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) {
+		remember_sender_source_root(path, st);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (sender_source_full_path(path, full, sizeof full) < 0)
+		overflow_exit("remember_sender_source_arg");
+	slash = strrchr(full, '/');
+	if (!slash)
+		return;
+	if (slash == full)
+		slash[1] = '\0';
+	else
+		*slash = '\0';
+	/* The operator selected this parent as part of the source argument. Pin
+	 * its resolved identity while the file leaf remains O_NOFOLLOW later. */
+	if (do_stat(full, &parent_st) == 0 && S_ISDIR(parent_st.st_mode))
+		remember_sender_source_root(full, &parent_st);
+}
+
+#if defined AT_FDCWD && defined O_NOFOLLOW && defined O_DIRECTORY
+/* Keep one validated source root open at a time.  A descriptor per explicit
+ * argument would make a large argument list exhaust the process limit. */
+static int sender_source_root_fd_for(struct sender_source_root *root)
+{
+	STRUCT_STAT st;
+	int fd, fl, saved_errno;
+
+	if (sender_source_root_fd_owner == root && sender_source_root_fd >= 0)
+		return sender_source_root_fd;
+	if (sender_source_root_fd >= 0)
+		close(sender_source_root_fd);
+	sender_source_root_fd = -1;
+	sender_source_root_fd_owner = NULL;
+
+	fd = open_anchor_dirfd(root->path);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (do_fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+		saved_errno = errno;
+	else if (st.st_dev != root->dev || st.st_ino != root->ino)
+		saved_errno = ELOOP;
+	else
+		saved_errno = 0;
+	if (saved_errno) {
+		close(fd);
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((fl = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD)) >= 0)
+		fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fl | FD_CLOEXEC);
+	sender_source_root_fd_owner = root;
+	sender_source_root_fd = fd;
+	return fd;
+}
+#endif
+
+int open_sender_source_path(const char *path, int flags, int *matched)
+{
+#if defined AT_FDCWD && defined O_NOFOLLOW && defined O_DIRECTORY
+	struct sender_source_root *root, *best = NULL;
+	char full[MAXPATHLEN], *rel;
+	size_t best_len = 0;
+	int rootfd, fd, saved_errno;
+
+	*matched = 0;
+	if (!sender_source_roots)
+		return -1;
+	if (sender_source_full_path(path, full, sizeof full) < 0)
+		return -1;
+	for (root = sender_source_roots; root; root = root->next) {
+		size_t len = strlen(root->path);
+		if (len > best_len && strncmp(full, root->path, len) == 0
+		 && (root->path[len-1] == '/' || full[len] == '\0' || full[len] == '/')) {
+			best = root;
+			best_len = len;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!best)
+		return -1;
+
+	*matched = 1;
+	rootfd = sender_source_root_fd_for(best);
+	if (rootfd < 0)
+		return -1;
+	rel = full + best_len;
+	while (*rel == '/')
+		rel++;
+	fd = secure_relative_open_at(rootfd, *rel ? rel : ".", flags, 0);
+	saved_errno = errno;
+	errno = saved_errno;
+	return fd;
+#else
+	*matched = 0;
+	errno = ENOSYS;
+	return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+void clear_sender_source_roots(void)
+{
+	if (sender_source_root_fd >= 0)
+		close(sender_source_root_fd);
+	sender_source_root_fd = -1;
+	sender_source_root_fd_owner = NULL;
+	while (sender_source_roots) {
+		struct sender_source_root *root = sender_source_roots;
+		sender_source_roots = root->next;
+		free(root);
+	}
+}
+
+static int filesfrom_link_stat(const char *path, STRUCT_STAT *stp, int follow_dirlinks)
+{
+#if defined AT_FDCWD && defined O_NOFOLLOW && defined O_DIRECTORY
+	const char *bname;
+	int dfd, ret, save_errno;
+
+	dfd = owner_walk_parent(path, &bname);
+	if (dfd < 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (am_root < 0) {
+		close(dfd);
+		return link_stat(path, stp, follow_dirlinks);
+	}
+	ret = do_lstat_atfd(dfd, bname, stp);
+	/* A list-selected directory symlink is a path component too. Resolve it
+	 * through the ownership and confinement walk before following it. */
+	if (ret == 0 && S_ISLNK(stp->st_mode)
+	 && (follow_dirlinks || copy_links)) {
+		int targetfd = open_no_attacker_symlinks_dirfd(path);
+		if (targetfd >= 0) {
+			ret = do_fstat(targetfd, stp);
+			close(targetfd);
+		} else if (errno != ENOENT && errno != ENOTDIR && errno != EACCES) {
+			ret = -1;
+		}
+	}
+	save_errno = ret < 0 ? errno : 0;
+	close(dfd);
+	errno = save_errno;
+	return ret;
+#else
+	return link_stat(path, stp, follow_dirlinks);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int filesfrom_readlink(const char *path, char *linkbuf, size_t bufsiz)
+{
+#if defined AT_FDCWD && defined O_NOFOLLOW && defined O_DIRECTORY
+	const char *bname;
+	int dfd, ret, save_errno;
+
+	dfd = owner_walk_parent(path, &bname);
+	if (dfd < 0)
+		return -1;
+	ret = do_readlink_atfd(dfd, bname, linkbuf, bufsiz);
+	save_errno = ret < 0 ? errno : 0;
+	close(dfd);
+	errno = save_errno;
+	return ret;
+#else
+	return do_readlink(path, linkbuf, bufsiz);
+#endif
+}
+
 static int scan_link_stat(const char *path, STRUCT_STAT *stp, int follow_dirlinks)
 {
 	/* Use the held scan fd only for a single component directly inside the
 	 * scanned dir, and only when am_root >= 0 (link_stat_at folds in no
 	 * fake-super %stat xattr; link_stat does so via get_stat_xattr, a no-op
 	 * once am_root >= 0). */
-	if (scan_dirfd >= 0 && am_root >= 0
+	if (scan_dirfd >= 0 && am_root >= 0 && !filesfrom_owner_walk_active()
 	 && strncmp(path, scan_dir_prefix, scan_dir_prefix_len) == 0
 	 && path[scan_dir_prefix_len] == '/'
 	 && strchr(path + scan_dir_prefix_len + 1, '/') == NULL)
 		return link_stat_at(scan_dirfd, path + scan_dir_prefix_len + 1, stp, follow_dirlinks);
+	if (filesfrom_owner_walk_active())
+		return filesfrom_link_stat(path, stp, follow_dirlinks);
 	return link_stat(path, stp, follow_dirlinks);
 }
 
 static int scan_readlink(const char *path, char *linkbuf, size_t bufsiz)
 {
-	if (scan_dirfd >= 0 && am_root >= 0
+	if (scan_dirfd >= 0 && am_root >= 0 && !filesfrom_owner_walk_active()
 	 && strncmp(path, scan_dir_prefix, scan_dir_prefix_len) == 0
 	 && path[scan_dir_prefix_len] == '/'
 	 && strchr(path + scan_dir_prefix_len + 1, '/') == NULL)
 		return do_readlink_atfd(scan_dirfd, path + scan_dir_prefix_len + 1, linkbuf, bufsiz);
+	if (filesfrom_owner_walk_active())
+		return filesfrom_readlink(path, linkbuf, bufsiz);
 	return do_readlink(path, linkbuf, bufsiz);
 }
 
@@ -2014,7 +2239,7 @@ static void interpret_stat_error(const char *fname, int is_dir)
 }
 
 #if defined HAVE_FDOPENDIR && defined HAVE_DIRFD
-/* Open a source directory for scanning confined beneath the transfer root.
+/* Open a source directory for scanning under the applicable source authority.
  * secure_relative_open() does a per-component O_NOFOLLOW walk that refuses a
  * parent component raced into a symlink pointing out of the tree; fdopendir()
  * then turns the held fd into the DIR* the scan reads.  This mirrors the
@@ -2025,13 +2250,24 @@ static void interpret_stat_error(const char *fname, int is_dir)
  * O_NOFOLLOW makes secure_relative_open() follow in-tree directory symlinks
  * beneath the anchor and refuse escapes, so this serves both the default
  * no-follow scan and a daemon's symlink-following scan (see the caller).
+ * Files-from entries instead use the ownership walk: their source base is
+ * operator-selected, but each list entry may not be, so only trusted-owned
+ * symlinks are followed and a trusted link may retain its legacy target.
  * Returns NULL with errno set on failure, like opendir(). */
 static DIR *secure_opendir(const char *fbuf)
 {
-	int dfd, fl;
+	int dfd, fl, matched;
 	DIR *d;
 
-	if (am_daemon && (!am_chrooted || module_dirlen)
+	if (filesfrom_owner_walk_active()) {
+		/* The source base is operator-selected, while each list entry may not
+		 * be. Follow only trusted-owned symlinks while opening the directory. */
+		dfd = open_no_attacker_symlinks(fbuf, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
+	} else if (!am_daemon && am_sender
+	 && (dfd = open_sender_source_path(fbuf, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, &matched), matched)) {
+		/* The command-line directory is the operator-selected transfer root.
+		 * Follow that root, then keep every recursive scan beneath its held fd. */
+	} else if (am_daemon && (!am_chrooted || module_dirlen)
 	 && module_dir && module_dir[0] == '/' && *fbuf != '/' && module_dirfd >= 0
 	 && curr_dir_len >= module_dirlen
 	 && strncmp(curr_dir, module_dir, module_dirlen) == 0
@@ -2251,8 +2487,11 @@ static void send_implied_dirs(int f, struct file_list *flist, char *fname,
 	if (need_new_dir) {
 		int save_copy_links = copy_links;
 		int save_xfer_dirs = xfer_dirs;
+		int save_filesfrom_owner_walk = filesfrom_owner_walk_override;
 		char *slash;
 
+		if (filesfrom_owner_walk_active())
+			filesfrom_owner_walk_override = 1;
 		copy_links = xfer_dirs = 1;
 
 		*limit = '\0';
@@ -2281,6 +2520,7 @@ static void send_implied_dirs(int f, struct file_list *flist, char *fname,
 
 		copy_links = save_copy_links;
 		xfer_dirs = save_xfer_dirs;
+		filesfrom_owner_walk_override = save_filesfrom_owner_walk;
 
 		if (!inc_recurse)
 			goto done;
@@ -2333,7 +2573,7 @@ static void send1extra(int f, struct file_struct *file, struct file_list *flist)
 	if (file->flags & FLAG_CONTENT_DIR) {
 		if (one_file_system) {
 			STRUCT_STAT st;
-			if (link_stat(fbuf, &st, copy_dirlinks) != 0) {
+			if (scan_link_stat(fbuf, &st, copy_dirlinks) != 0) {
 				interpret_stat_error(fbuf, True);
 				return;
 			}
@@ -2369,7 +2609,7 @@ static void send1extra(int f, struct file_struct *file, struct file_list *flist)
 		if (name_type != NORMAL_NAME) {
 			STRUCT_STAT st = {0};
 
-			if (name_type != MISSING_NAME && link_stat(fbuf, &st, 1) != 0) {
+			if (name_type != MISSING_NAME && scan_link_stat(fbuf, &st, 1) != 0) {
 				interpret_stat_error(fbuf, True);
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -2694,7 +2934,7 @@ struct file_list *send_file_list(int f, int argc, char *argv[])
 		if (fn != fbuf)
 			memmove(fbuf, fn, len + 1);
 
-		if (link_stat(fbuf, &st, copy_dirlinks || name_type != NORMAL_NAME) != 0
+		if (scan_link_stat(fbuf, &st, copy_dirlinks || name_type != NORMAL_NAME) != 0
 		 || (name_type != DOTDIR_NAME && is_excluded(fbuf, S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) != 0, SERVER_FILTERS))
 		 || (relative_paths && path_is_daemon_excluded(fbuf, 1))) {
 			if (errno != ENOENT || missing_args == 0) {
@@ -2724,6 +2964,9 @@ struct file_list *send_file_list(int f, int argc, char *argv[])
 			rprintf(FINFO, "skipping directory %s\n", fbuf);
 			continue;
 		}
+		if (!am_daemon && !use_ff_fd && st.st_mode != 0
+		 && (relative_paths || S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)))
+			remember_sender_source_arg(fbuf, &st);
 
 		if (inc_recurse && relative_paths && *fbuf) {
 			if ((p = strchr(fbuf+1, '/')) != NULL) {
diff --git a/rsync.1.md b/rsync.1.md
index 8ef6a1c7b..ebc504b70 100644
--- a/rsync.1.md
+++ b/rsync.1.md
@@ -1424,10 +1424,13 @@ sign) if you want the local shell to expand it.
 
 0.  `--confine-root=DIR`
 
-    This bounds where the paths listed under [`--insecure-links`](#opt) are
-    allowed to resolve: one that ends up outside DIR is refused, even if every
-    symlink along it was owned by a trusted user.  The ownership walk asks who
-    planted a link; this asks where the path came out.
+    In the default symlink mode this bounds where operator option paths and
+    paths selected from a [`--files-from`](#opt) list are allowed to resolve:
+    one that ends up outside DIR is refused, even if every symlink along it was
+    owned by a trusted user. Explicit source roots remain operator-selected
+    transfer roots.
+    The ownership walk asks who planted a link; this asks where the path came
+    out.
 
     DIR must be absolute.  Nothing is confined by default, and
     `--confine-root=/` is a no-op.
diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
index ba40b9468..1ff6a1d63 100644
--- a/sender.c
+++ b/sender.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ extern char *module_dir;
 extern int module_dirfd;
 extern int write_batch;
 extern int file_old_total;
+extern char *files_from;
 extern BOOL want_progress_now;
 extern struct stats stats;
 extern struct file_list *cur_flist, *first_flist, *dir_flist;
@@ -90,6 +91,9 @@ static int secure_sender_parent_fd(struct file_struct *file, const char *fname,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	if (filesfrom_owner_walk_active())
+		return owner_walk_parent(fname, bname_p);
+
 	if (!am_daemon || !module_dir || module_dir[0] != '/') {
 		/* Local (non-daemon) sender: there is no module root to anchor at, but
 		 * still confine the parent via the shared held ancestor-dirfd stack
@@ -680,26 +684,27 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
 			else
 				fd = sender_open_confined(module_dir, relp, O_RDONLY);
 		} else if (!copy_links && !copy_unsafe_links && !copy_dirlinks && !insecure_links) {
-			/* Default symlink handling (no dir-link following): the scan
-			 * recorded this as a regular file.  Open it confined beneath the
-			 * transfer root: an in-tree symlinked parent (e.g. -R keeps one in
-			 * the path) is followed beneath the root, a parent raced into a
-			 * symlink pointing out of the tree is refused, and O_NOFOLLOW
-			 * governs the leaf so a raced leaf symlink is refused.  A
-			 * symlink-following mode (-L/--copy-unsafe-links/-k) or
-			 * --insecure-links keeps the legacy open below. */
-			if (fname[0] == '/') {
-				/* --relative (or a --files-from absolute name) keeps the
-				 * full absolute path as fname; the transfer root is then "/",
-				 * so anchor the confined open there and strip the leading
-				 * slash to the module-relative path the resolver wants -- it
-				 * rejects an absolute relpath outright. */
-				const char *relp = fname;
-				while (*relp == '/')
-					relp++;
-				fd = sender_open_confined("/", relp, O_RDONLY);
-			} else
-				fd = sender_open_confined(NULL, fname, O_RDONLY);
+			int matched;
+			/* A files-from entry follows only trusted-owned ancestors because
+			 * its source base is operator-selected but the entry itself may not
+			 * be. Other paths stay confined beneath their explicit transfer root.
+			 * Every file leaf remains O_NOFOLLOW. */
+			if (files_from) {
+				fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
+			} else {
+				fd = open_sender_source_path(fname, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW, &matched);
+				if (!matched) {
+					if (fname[0] == '/') {
+						/* --relative keeps the full absolute path as fname;
+						 * anchor at "/" and pass the resolver a relative path. */
+						const char *relp = fname;
+						while (*relp == '/')
+							relp++;
+						fd = sender_open_confined("/", relp, O_RDONLY);
+					} else
+						fd = sender_open_confined(NULL, fname, O_RDONLY);
+				}
+			}
 		} else {
 			fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
 		}
@@ -809,6 +814,7 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
 	if (DEBUG_GTE(SEND, 1))
 		rprintf(FINFO, "send files finished\n");
 
+	clear_sender_source_roots();
 	match_report();
 
 	write_ndx(f_out, NDX_DONE);
diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
index 81e12f906..dce4170c5 100644
--- a/syscall.c
+++ b/syscall.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ extern int preserve_executability;
 extern int open_noatime;
 extern int copy_links;
 extern int copy_unsafe_links;
+extern int copy_dirlinks;
 extern int am_daemon;
 extern int am_chrooted;
 extern int insecure_links;
@@ -69,10 +70,12 @@ extern int module_id;
 extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
 extern char *module_dir;
 extern int module_dirfd;	/* daemon: served module root pinned by identity, or -1 */
+extern char *files_from;
 extern char *confine_root;	/* --confine-root, or NULL; see confinement_root() */
 extern unsigned int confine_rootlen;
 extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];	/* defined below; fwd-declared for the seed */
 extern int operator_path_resolve;	/* defined below; fwd-declared for the exclude check */
+extern int filesfrom_owner_walk_override;	/* defined below; used by files-from implied dirs */
 
 /* A directory fd used only for pathname traversal, fchdir(), or as *at()
  * authority does not need read permission on Linux.  Keep the portable
@@ -96,7 +99,7 @@ static int directory_traverse_flags(void)
  * and EACCESes when the module sits under a non-traversable parent (a 0700 home).
  * Functionally identical (same inode), just privilege-drop-safe.  Gated like its
  * callers (the secure resolver and dpc_dir_fd both require these three). */
-static int open_anchor_dirfd(const char *path)
+int open_anchor_dirfd(const char *path)
 {
 	if (module_dirfd >= 0 && am_daemon && module_dir && strcmp(path, module_dir) == 0)
 		return dup(module_dirfd);
@@ -140,6 +143,16 @@ int symlink_optout_allowed(void)
 	return insecure_links;
 }
 
+/* A files-from entry is peer-selected, even when its source base was supplied
+ * by the operator.  Keep its ownership walk inside --confine-root when one is
+ * active. */
+int filesfrom_owner_walk_active(void)
+{
+	return !am_daemon && am_sender && files_from
+	    && !copy_unsafe_links && !copy_dirlinks && !insecure_links
+	    && (!copy_links || filesfrom_owner_walk_override);
+}
+
 /* The root an operator/peer-supplied path must stay under, or NULL when nothing
  * is confined.  A daemon has the served module; a server launched by a wrapper
  * with its own restricted directory (rrsync) gets one from --confine-root.
@@ -204,25 +217,29 @@ static int is_exact_fd_pin(const char *p)
 
 /* Refuse (return 1) when the ABSOLUTE resolved path `abspath` lands OUTSIDE the
  * confinement root, for an operator/peer-supplied path that must stay inside it
- * (--partial-dir/--backup-dir/alt-basis/merge files: operator_path_resolve).  An
+ * (--partial-dir/--backup-dir/alt-basis/merge files or files-from entries).  An
  * in-tree symlink owned by uid 0 / the euid is followed by design, so it can
  * redirect the resolved target outside the root; this catches that escape.
+ * `final` distinguishes a completed target from an ancestor crossed on the way
+ * to it.
  *
  * This is ROOT confinement only.  The daemon exclude/filter list is a name-based
  * visibility filter, NOT a physical-path boundary: a symlink whose own name is
  * not excluded may still resolve into an excluded IN-tree subtree, exactly as in
  * stock rsync.  The defense for a writable module is `munge symlinks` (see
  * rsyncd.conf(5)), not this walk. */
-static int abspath_outside_confinement(const char *abspath)
+static int abspath_outside_confinement(const char *abspath, int final)
 {
 	unsigned int rootlen;
 	const char *root = confinement_root(&rootlen);
 	char pinned[MAXPATHLEN];
+	int enforce;
 
 	if (!root || !abspath)
 		return 0;
 	if (rootlen <= 1)			/* root is "/": nothing is outside */
 		return 0;
+	enforce = operator_path_resolve || filesfrom_owner_walk_active();
 	/* An fd pin (rrsync rewrites a validated option path to /proc/self/fd/N so
 	 * no later symlink can redirect it) is spelled outside the root by
 	 * construction.  Judge it by what it points AT rather than by its spelling,
@@ -236,7 +253,7 @@ static int abspath_outside_confinement(const char *abspath)
 		if (is_exact_fd_pin(abspath)) {
 			ssize_t n = readlink(abspath, pinned, sizeof pinned - 1);
 			if (n <= 0 || pinned[0] != '/')
-				return operator_path_resolve ? 1 : 0;
+				return enforce ? 1 : 0;
 			pinned[n] = '\0';
 			abspath = pinned;
 		}
@@ -248,14 +265,43 @@ static int abspath_outside_confinement(const char *abspath)
 	 * ("/", "/home", ...) on the way down -- those are not "outside", just
 	 * not-yet-arrived, so allow them.  A path that has truly DIVERGED is
 	 * outside: refuse it for an operator/peer path that must stay in the tree
-	 * (operator_path_resolve); other opens (--log-file, --*-from, lock/motd)
+	 * (operator_path_resolve or filesfrom_owner_walk_active()); other opens
+	 * (--log-file, --*-from, lock/motd)
 	 * may legitimately live elsewhere.  The --insecure-links / "insecure links
 	 * = yes" opt-out short-circuits before we get here. */
 	size_t alen = strlen(abspath);
 	if (alen == 0
 	 || (strncmp(abspath, root, alen) == 0 && root[alen] == '/'))
-		return 0;			/* ancestor of the root: still descending */
-	return operator_path_resolve ? 1 : 0;
+		return enforce && final ? 1 : 0;	/* an ancestor is valid only while descending */
+	return enforce ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Check a completed path made from a tracked directory and one leaf. */
+static int check_abspath_leaf(const char *base, const char *leaf)
+{
+	char leafabs[MAXPATHLEN];
+	size_t baselen;
+	int n;
+
+	if (!base || !*base) {
+		if (abspath_outside_confinement(base, 1)) {
+			errno = ELOOP;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	baselen = strlen(base);
+	n = snprintf(leafabs, sizeof leafabs, "%s%s%s", base,
+		     base[baselen - 1] == '/' ? "" : "/", leaf);
+	if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof leafabs) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (abspath_outside_confinement(leafabs, 1)) {
+		errno = ELOOP;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Advance the tracked absolute path `abspath` by one resolved component,
@@ -408,7 +454,7 @@ static int ona_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode, char *out_abs, siz
 					saved_errno = errno;
 					goto out;
 				}
-				if (!pin_transit && abspath_outside_confinement(abspath)) {
+				if (!pin_transit && abspath_outside_confinement(abspath, 1)) {
 					saved_errno = ELOOP;
 					goto out;
 				}
@@ -526,7 +572,7 @@ static int ona_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode, char *out_abs, siz
 				saved_errno = errno;
 				goto out;
 			}
-			if (!pin_transit && abspath_outside_confinement(abspath)) {
+			if (!pin_transit && abspath_outside_confinement(abspath, 1)) {
 				saved_errno = ELOOP;
 				goto out;
 			}
@@ -537,7 +583,7 @@ static int ona_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode, char *out_abs, siz
 			if (retfd >= 0 && out_abs && out_cap)
 				/* Root-resolved (".." popped abspath empty) tracked daemon walk:
 				 * hand back "/" so owner_walk_parent still leaf-checks (path=/ bypass). */
-				strlcpy(out_abs, (am_daemon && !abspath[0]) ? "/" : abspath, out_cap);
+				strlcpy(out_abs, !abspath[0] ? "/" : abspath, out_cap);
 			goto out;
 		}
 
@@ -550,7 +596,7 @@ static int ona_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode, char *out_abs, siz
 			saved_errno = errno;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if (!pin_transit && abspath_outside_confinement(abspath)) {
+		if (!pin_transit && abspath_outside_confinement(abspath, 0)) {
 			saved_errno = ELOOP;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -578,12 +624,16 @@ static int ona_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode, char *out_abs, siz
 	 * an O_PATH fd is sufficient for traversal and fchdir but not operations
 	 * such as fchmod. */
 	if (flags & O_DIRECTORY) {
+		if (!pin_transit && abspath_outside_confinement(abspath, 1)) {
+			saved_errno = ELOOP;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		retfd = openat(dfd, ".", flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
 		saved_errno = retfd < 0 ? errno : 0;
 		if (out_abs && out_cap)
 			/* Root-resolved (".." popped abspath empty) tracked daemon walk:
 			 * hand back "/" so owner_walk_parent still leaf-checks (path=/ bypass). */
-			strlcpy(out_abs, (am_daemon && !abspath[0]) ? "/" : abspath, out_cap);
+			strlcpy(out_abs, !abspath[0] ? "/" : abspath, out_cap);
 	} else {
 		saved_errno = EISDIR;
 	}
@@ -622,6 +672,7 @@ int open_no_attacker_symlinks_dirfd(const char *path)
  * relevant ops by backup.c et al.; the opt-out (--insecure-links / "insecure
  * links =") restores legacy following.  Default 0 (transfer-path resolver). */
 int operator_path_resolve = 0;
+int filesfrom_owner_walk_override = 0;
 
 #if defined AT_FDCWD && defined O_NOFOLLOW && defined O_DIRECTORY
 /* For an operator-supplied path: open its parent directory via the ownership
@@ -655,15 +706,8 @@ int owner_walk_parent(const char *path, const char **bname)
 	 * module in an otherwise-served dir.  (The module exclude/filter is name-
 	 * based and not enforced here -- see abspath_outside_confinement.) */
 	if (pabs[0]) {
-		char leafabs[MAXPATHLEN];
-		if (snprintf(leafabs, sizeof leafabs, "%s/%s", pabs, *bname) >= (int)sizeof leafabs) {
-			close(dfd);
-			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;	/* fail closed, never skip the check */
-			return -1;
-		}
-		if (abspath_outside_confinement(leafabs)) {
+		if (check_abspath_leaf(pabs, *bname) < 0) {
 			close(dfd);
-			errno = ELOOP;
 			return -1;
 		}
 	}
@@ -2890,12 +2934,14 @@ static int ds_path_push(struct dirstack *ds, const char *comp)
 	if (al == 0)
 		return 0;		/* unseeded: tracking disabled for this walk */
 	size_t cl = strlen(comp);
-	if (al + 1 + cl >= sizeof ds->abspath) {
+	size_t off = (al > 0 && ds->abspath[al - 1] == '/') ? al : al + 1;
+	if (off + cl >= sizeof ds->abspath) {
 		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
 		return -1;
 	}
-	ds->abspath[al] = '/';
-	memcpy(ds->abspath + al + 1, comp, cl + 1);
+	if (off != al)
+		ds->abspath[al] = '/';
+	memcpy(ds->abspath + off, comp, cl + 1);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2982,7 +3028,7 @@ static int ds_descend(struct dirstack *ds, const char *part, int *hops)
 			return -1;
 		/* exclude-aware: refuse descending into a module-hidden dir (catches a
 		 * symlink that redirected the walk into an excluded subtree). */
-		if (abspath_outside_confinement(ds->abspath)) {
+		if (abspath_outside_confinement(ds->abspath, 0)) {
 			errno = ELOOP;
 			return -1;
 		}
@@ -3096,7 +3142,10 @@ static int secure_walk_at(int anchor_fd, const char *anchor_abspath,
 			if (ds_descend(&ds, part, hops) < 0)
 				goto cleanup;
 			if (is_last) {
-				if (flags & O_DIRECTORY)
+				if ((flags & O_DIRECTORY)
+				 && abspath_outside_confinement(ds.abspath, 1))
+					errno = ELOOP;
+				else if (flags & O_DIRECTORY)
 					retfd = openat(ds_cur(&ds), ".", flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
 				else
 					errno = EISDIR;
@@ -3108,15 +3157,8 @@ static int secure_walk_at(int anchor_fd, const char *anchor_abspath,
 		/* File leaf (final component, caller did not ask for O_DIRECTORY):
 		 * never follow a symlink leaf. */
 		if (is_last && !(flags & O_DIRECTORY)) {
-			if (ds.abspath[0]) {
-				char leafabs[MAXPATHLEN];
-				if (snprintf(leafabs, sizeof leafabs, "%s/%s", ds.abspath, part)
-				      < (int)sizeof leafabs
-				 && abspath_outside_confinement(leafabs)) {
-					errno = ELOOP;
-					goto cleanup;
-				}
-			}
+			if (check_abspath_leaf(ds.abspath, part) < 0)
+				goto cleanup;
 			int next_fd = openat(ds_cur(&ds), part,
 					     directory_traverse_flags() | O_NOFOLLOW);
 			if (next_fd == -1 && (errno == ENOTDIR || errno == ENOENT)) {
@@ -3132,6 +3174,8 @@ static int secure_walk_at(int anchor_fd, const char *anchor_abspath,
 
 		/* O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW leaf: the caller's O_NOFOLLOW governs the leaf. */
 		if (is_last && (flags & O_NOFOLLOW)) {
+			if (check_abspath_leaf(ds.abspath, part) < 0)
+				goto cleanup;
 			retfd = openat(ds_cur(&ds), part, flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
 			goto cleanup;
 		}
@@ -3144,6 +3188,10 @@ static int secure_walk_at(int anchor_fd, const char *anchor_abspath,
 			goto cleanup;
 		}
 		if (is_last) {
+			if (abspath_outside_confinement(ds.abspath, 1)) {
+				errno = ELOOP;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
 			retfd = openat(ds_cur(&ds), ".", flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
 			goto cleanup;
 		}
@@ -3153,7 +3201,10 @@ static int secure_walk_at(int anchor_fd, const char *anchor_abspath,
 	 * access, else EISDIR.  An AT_FDCWD anchor is not a resolvable target, so it
 	 * fails rather than silently returning the cwd. */
 	if (!saw_component) {
-		if ((flags & O_DIRECTORY) && anchor_fd != AT_FDCWD)
+		if ((flags & O_DIRECTORY)
+		 && abspath_outside_confinement(ds.abspath, 1))
+			errno = ELOOP;
+		else if ((flags & O_DIRECTORY) && anchor_fd != AT_FDCWD)
 			retfd = openat(anchor_fd, ".", flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
 		else
 			errno = EISDIR;
@@ -3545,6 +3596,26 @@ int do_open_checklinks(const char *pathname)
 	if (copy_links || copy_unsafe_links) {
 		return do_open(pathname, O_RDONLY, 0);
 	}
+#if defined AT_FDCWD && defined O_NOFOLLOW && defined O_DIRECTORY
+	if (am_sender && !am_daemon && files_from
+	 && !copy_dirlinks && !symlink_optout_allowed()) {
+		const char *bname;
+		int dfd, fd, save_errno, open_flags = O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW;
+
+		dfd = owner_walk_parent(pathname, &bname);
+		if (dfd < 0)
+			return -1;
+#ifdef O_NOATIME
+		if (open_noatime)
+			open_flags |= O_NOATIME;
+#endif
+		fd = openat(dfd, bname, open_flags, 0);
+		save_errno = fd < 0 ? errno : 0;
+		close(dfd);
+		errno = save_errno;
+		return fd;
+	}
+#endif
 	return do_open_nofollow(pathname, O_RDONLY);
 }
 
diff --git a/t_secure_relpath.c b/t_secure_relpath.c
index d20570d61..184acef67 100644
--- a/t_secure_relpath.c
+++ b/t_secure_relpath.c
@@ -224,7 +224,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	 * literal '..'.  Its dedicated fd-anchored entry point must preserve an
 	 * in-tree climb while refusing to pop above the anchor. */
 	check_beneath_dotdot();
-
 	if (errs)
 		fprintf(stderr, "\n%d failure(s)\n", errs);
 	return errs ? 1 : 0;
diff --git a/t_stub.c b/t_stub.c
index 1518c7932..c5a39bfab 100644
--- a/t_stub.c
+++ b/t_stub.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ int inplace = 0;
 int am_daemon = 0;
 int am_chrooted = 0;
 int insecure_links = 0;
+int copy_dirlinks = 0;
 int modify_window = 0;
 int preallocate_files = 0;
 int sparse_files = 0;
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ size_t max_alloc = (size_t)-1; /* test helpers are not memory-constrained;
 				* per-component fallback of secure_relative_open()
 				* hits at its first my_strdup() call. */
 char *partial_dir;
+char *files_from;
 char *module_dir;
 int module_dirfd = -1;
 char *confine_root;
diff --git a/testsuite/relative-source-ancestor_test.py b/testsuite/relative-source-ancestor_test.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3864ededc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testsuite/relative-source-ancestor_test.py
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Explicit source directory symlinks remain transfer roots."""
+
+import os
+import pwd
+import subprocess
+
+from rsyncfns import SCRATCHDIR, rsync_argv, test_fail
+
+real = SCRATCHDIR / 'real'
+source = real / 'My_Documents'
+source.mkdir(parents=True)
+(source / 'marker').write_text('source contents\n')
+absolute_link = SCRATCHDIR / 'home'
+relative_link = SCRATCHDIR / 'relative-home'
+os.symlink(str(real), absolute_link)
+os.symlink(str(real), relative_link)
+
+cases = (
+    (('-r',), False),
+    (('-rR',), True),
+    (('-rR', '--no-inc-recursive'), True),
+)
+
+for link_name, link, cwd in (
+    ('absolute', absolute_link, None),
+    ('relative', relative_link, SCRATCHDIR),
+):
+    source_arg = (str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/./home/My_Documents/' if cwd is None
+                  else 'relative-home/My_Documents/')
+    for index, (options, relative) in enumerate(cases):
+        dest = SCRATCHDIR / f'dest-{link_name}-descendant-{index}'
+        dest.mkdir()
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            rsync_argv(*options, source_arg, str(dest) + '/'),
+            cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True,
+        )
+        if proc.returncode:
+            test_fail(f'{link_name} descendant source transfer with {options} '
+                      f'failed: {proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+        expected = (dest / link.name / 'My_Documents' / 'marker' if relative
+                    else dest / 'marker')
+        if not expected.is_file() or expected.read_text() != 'source contents\n':
+            test_fail('relative source layout or contents changed')
+
+file_sources = (
+    ('absolute-file', str(absolute_link / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'), None),
+    ('relative-file', 'relative-home/My_Documents/marker', SCRATCHDIR),
+)
+for name, source_arg, cwd in file_sources:
+    dest = SCRATCHDIR / f'dest-{name}'
+    dest.mkdir()
+    proc = subprocess.run(
+        rsync_argv('-R', source_arg, str(dest) + '/'),
+        cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True,
+    )
+    if proc.returncode:
+        test_fail(f'{name} transfer failed: {proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+    if cwd is None:
+        expected = dest / str(absolute_link.relative_to('/')) / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'
+    else:
+        expected = dest / source_arg
+    if not expected.is_file() or expected.read_text() != 'source contents\n':
+        test_fail(f'{name} layout or contents changed')
+
+files_from = SCRATCHDIR / 'files-from'
+files_from.write_text('relative-home/My_Documents/marker\n')
+dest = SCRATCHDIR / 'dest-files-from'
+dest.mkdir()
+proc = subprocess.run(
+    rsync_argv('-r', f'--files-from={files_from}',
+               str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+    capture_output=True, text=True,
+)
+expected = dest / 'relative-home' / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'
+if proc.returncode or not expected.is_file() or expected.read_text() != 'source contents\n':
+    test_fail(f'files-from trusted ancestor transfer failed: '
+              f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+files_from.write_text('relative-home/My_Documents/\n')
+dest = SCRATCHDIR / 'dest-files-from-dir'
+dest.mkdir()
+proc = subprocess.run(
+    rsync_argv('-r', f'--files-from={files_from}',
+               str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+    capture_output=True, text=True,
+)
+expected = dest / 'relative-home' / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'
+if proc.returncode or not expected.is_file() or expected.read_text() != 'source contents\n':
+    test_fail(f'files-from trusted directory transfer failed: '
+              f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+remove_source = real / 'remove-marker'
+remove_source.write_text('remove contents\n')
+files_from.write_text('relative-home/remove-marker\n')
+dest = SCRATCHDIR / 'dest-files-from-remove'
+dest.mkdir()
+proc = subprocess.run(
+    rsync_argv('-r', '--remove-source-files', f'--files-from={files_from}',
+               str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+    capture_output=True, text=True,
+)
+expected = dest / 'relative-home' / 'remove-marker'
+if proc.returncode or remove_source.exists() or not expected.is_file():
+    test_fail(f'files-from remove-source-files failed: '
+              f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+confined_root = SCRATCHDIR / 'confined-root'
+confined_root.mkdir()
+confined_outside = SCRATCHDIR / 'confined-outside'
+confined_outside.mkdir()
+(confined_outside / 'marker').write_text('outside contents\n')
+os.symlink(str(confined_outside), confined_root / 'outside-link')
+confined_inside = confined_root / 'inside'
+confined_inside.mkdir()
+(confined_inside / 'marker').write_text('inside contents\n')
+os.symlink(str(confined_inside), confined_root / 'inside-link')
+confined_files_from = confined_root / 'files-from'
+
+confined_files_from.write_text('inside-link/marker\n')
+dest = confined_root / 'confined-inside-dest'
+dest.mkdir()
+proc = subprocess.run(
+    rsync_argv('-r', f'--confine-root={confined_root}',
+               f'--files-from={confined_files_from}',
+               str(confined_root) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+    capture_output=True, text=True,
+)
+expected = dest / 'inside-link' / 'marker'
+if proc.returncode or not expected.is_file() or expected.read_text() != 'inside contents\n':
+    test_fail(f'files-from trusted in-root link failed under confinement: '
+              f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+confined_files_from.write_text('outside-link/marker\n')
+dest = confined_root / 'confined-outside-dest'
+dest.mkdir()
+proc = subprocess.run(
+    rsync_argv('-r', f'--confine-root={confined_root}',
+               f'--files-from={confined_files_from}',
+               str(confined_root) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+    capture_output=True, text=True,
+)
+escaped = dest / 'outside-link' / 'marker'
+if proc.returncode == 0 or escaped.exists():
+    test_fail(f'files-from followed a trusted link outside --confine-root: '
+              f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+confined_files_from.write_text('outside-link/\n')
+dest = confined_root / 'confined-outside-dir-dest'
+dest.mkdir()
+proc = subprocess.run(
+    rsync_argv('-r', f'--confine-root={confined_root}',
+               f'--files-from={confined_files_from}',
+               str(confined_root) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+    capture_output=True, text=True,
+)
+escaped = dest / 'outside-link' / 'marker'
+if proc.returncode == 0 or escaped.exists():
+    test_fail(f'files-from enumerated a trusted link outside --confine-root: '
+              f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+os.symlink(str(confined_root.parent), confined_root / 'ancestor-link')
+confined_files_from.write_text('ancestor-link/\n')
+dest = confined_root / 'confined-ancestor-dest'
+dest.mkdir()
+proc = subprocess.run(
+    rsync_argv('-d', f'--confine-root={confined_root}',
+               f'--files-from={confined_files_from}',
+               str(confined_root) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+    capture_output=True, text=True,
+)
+if proc.returncode == 0 or (dest / 'ancestor-link').exists():
+    test_fail(f'files-from accepted a trusted ancestor of --confine-root: '
+              f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+root_real = SCRATCHDIR / 'root-real'
+root_real.mkdir()
+(root_real / 'marker').write_text('source contents\n')
+absolute_root_link = SCRATCHDIR / 'root-home'
+relative_root_link = SCRATCHDIR / 'relative-root-home'
+os.symlink(str(root_real), absolute_root_link)
+os.symlink(str(root_real), relative_root_link)
+
+for link_name, link, cwd in (
+    ('absolute', absolute_root_link, None),
+    ('relative', relative_root_link, SCRATCHDIR),
+):
+    source_arg = (str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/./root-home/' if cwd is None
+                  else 'relative-root-home/')
+    for index, (options, relative) in enumerate(cases):
+        dest = SCRATCHDIR / f'dest-{link_name}-root-{index}'
+        dest.mkdir()
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            rsync_argv(*options, source_arg, str(dest) + '/'),
+            cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True,
+        )
+        if proc.returncode:
+            test_fail(f'{link_name} root source transfer with {options} failed: '
+                      f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+        expected = dest / link.name / 'marker' if relative else dest / 'marker'
+        if not expected.is_file() or expected.read_text() != 'source contents\n':
+            test_fail('explicit source-root layout or contents changed')
+
+if os.geteuid() == 0:
+    untrusted_uid = next((entry.pw_uid for entry in pwd.getpwall()
+                          if entry.pw_uid != 0), None)
+    if untrusted_uid is not None:
+        untrusted_link = SCRATCHDIR / 'untrusted-home'
+        os.symlink(str(real), untrusted_link)
+        os.lchown(untrusted_link, untrusted_uid, -1)
+        source_arg = str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/./untrusted-home/'
+        for index, (options, relative) in enumerate(cases[:2]):
+            dest = SCRATCHDIR / f'untrusted-dest-{index}'
+            dest.mkdir()
+            proc = subprocess.run(
+                rsync_argv(*options, source_arg, str(dest) + '/'),
+                capture_output=True, text=True,
+            )
+            expected = dest / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'
+            if relative:
+                expected = dest / 'untrusted-home' / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'
+            if proc.returncode or not expected.is_file():
+                test_fail(f'explicit untrusted-owned source link with {options} '
+                          f'failed: {proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+        dest = SCRATCHDIR / 'untrusted-file-dest'
+        dest.mkdir()
+        source_arg = str(untrusted_link / 'My_Documents' / 'marker')
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            rsync_argv('-R', source_arg, str(dest) + '/'),
+            capture_output=True, text=True,
+        )
+        expected = dest / str(untrusted_link.relative_to('/')) / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'
+        if proc.returncode or not expected.is_file():
+            test_fail(f'explicit untrusted-owned file path failed: '
+                      f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+        files_from.write_text('untrusted-home/My_Documents/marker\n')
+        dest = SCRATCHDIR / 'untrusted-files-from-dest'
+        dest.mkdir()
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            rsync_argv('-r', f'--files-from={files_from}',
+                       str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+            capture_output=True, text=True,
+        )
+        escaped = dest / 'untrusted-home' / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'
+        if proc.returncode == 0 or escaped.exists():
+            test_fail('files-from followed an untrusted-owned ancestor symlink')
+
+        files_from.write_text('untrusted-home/My_Documents/\n')
+        dest = SCRATCHDIR / 'untrusted-files-from-dir-dest'
+        dest.mkdir()
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            rsync_argv('-r', f'--files-from={files_from}',
+                       str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+            capture_output=True, text=True,
+        )
+        escaped = dest / 'untrusted-home' / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'
+        if proc.returncode == 0 or escaped.exists():
+            test_fail('files-from enumerated an untrusted-owned ancestor symlink')
+
+        files_from.write_text('untrusted-home/\n')
+        dest = SCRATCHDIR / 'untrusted-files-from-leaf-dir-dest'
+        dest.mkdir()
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            rsync_argv('-r', f'--files-from={files_from}',
+                       str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+            capture_output=True, text=True,
+        )
+        escaped = dest / 'untrusted-home' / 'marker'
+        if proc.returncode == 0 or escaped.exists():
+            test_fail('files-from followed an untrusted-owned directory link')
+
+        files_from.write_text('untrusted-home/My_Documents/marker\n')
+        dest = SCRATCHDIR / 'insecure-files-from-dest'
+        dest.mkdir()
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            rsync_argv('-r', '--insecure-links', f'--files-from={files_from}',
+                       str(SCRATCHDIR) + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+            capture_output=True, text=True,
+        )
+        expected = dest / 'untrusted-home' / 'My_Documents' / 'marker'
+        if proc.returncode or not expected.is_file():
+            test_fail(f'files-from insecure-links opt-out failed: '
+                      f'{proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+
+dest = SCRATCHDIR / 'remove-dest'
+dest.mkdir()
+proc = subprocess.run(
+    rsync_argv('-r', '--remove-source-files', str(absolute_link / 'My_Documents') + '/', str(dest) + '/'),
+    capture_output=True, text=True,
+)
+expected = dest / 'marker'
+if proc.returncode or (source / 'marker').exists() or not expected.is_file():
+    test_fail(f'remove-source-files failed: {proc.stdout}{proc.stderr}')
+(source / 'marker').write_text('source contents\n')