[KSlashh]

Audit item M5. Open against dev. Wire change: operator and verifier nodes must run the same version (this ships with the redeploy).

The operator bound a GenCircuits verifier_pubkey to the first peer that claimed it. A registered verifier could claim another verifier's key first; the real holder was then refused as "already bound to another peer", and the graph stalled because the selected key had no one to endorse it.

• GenCircuits carries a Schnorr signature by verifier_pubkey over a domain tag, instance id, graph id, the key and the sender's peer id. The operator ignores a GenCircuits whose signature does not verify for its gossip author.
• The setup package is not signed: gossip already authenticates the sender, and only the key-to-peer claim needs the key holder's consent.
• Checking the key against the sender's NodeInfo binding instead was not usable: verifier NodeInfo heartbeats only reach the committee topic, and unregistered rows are purged after 15 minutes, so operators would soon have no verifier bindings.

Tests: the holder's message verifies for its own peer only; another peer's signature over the holder's key, and the holder's signature moved to another graph, are refused. Node tests and workspace clippy pass.

Validation results above are recorded in the zkm PR notes. Branch scope and diff formatting were checked locally; builds and tests were not rerun during publication.