Security maintenance targets vps_testai, the production branch configured in the checked-in workflows. Include your affected commit when reporting; you do not need to upgrade a live deployment before submitting a report. The current hosted default branch and private-reporting availability must be checked on GitHub, not inferred from this file.

Do not publish exploit details, secrets, tokens, API keys, Telegram init data, database dumps, or private chat data in a public issue.

Preferred reporting path:

1. Open a private GitHub Security Advisory for this repository.
2. Include the affected commit or release, reproduction steps, expected impact, and any relevant logs with secrets redacted.
3. If private advisories are not available to you, open a minimal public issue that says you have a security report and avoid sensitive details until a private contact path is established.

• API keys are encrypted using Fernet derived from ADMIN_SECRET; preserve that secret when moving encrypted data. It is not an AES-GCM implementation.
• Private-memory consent, provenance and account deletion are application controls, not a blanket compliance or database-isolation guarantee. The current single migration/runtime DSN may use a role that bypasses RLS; see database boundaries.
• Telegraph publication is public and disabled by default, including Reader mirrors. Local erasure cannot retract previously exported or third-party copies.
• Integration tests and migration tools can mutate schema/data. Use disposable targets as described in CONTRIBUTING.md.
• Protected logs default to bounded, scrubbed message text on authorized paths; LOG_CONTENT_MODE=metadata disables text. Private-memory bodies, birth data and full credentials remain forbidden. Grafana datasource access exposes the stream; local rotation/Loki retention are not host-loss backups. See logging.
• Webhook secrets are optional, validated by app/webhook_security.py and compared in constant time. /metrics is unauthenticated in application code; deployments can restrict scraping at the reverse proxy.
• Dashboard password/session authentication requires a configured ADMIN_SECRET. Without it, that login path is disabled and session signing uses a random fallback; the separately verified Telegram administrator identity path remains available. This behavior was regression-tested in the 2026-10-23 codebase audit.

Please prioritize responsible disclosure for issues involving:

• Telegram initData validation and Mini App authentication;
• webhook routing and request signature handling;
• WebSocket authorization for Crocodile and Live Audio flows;
• provider API key storage, rotation, and logging;
• prompt/template injection that can leak private memory or secrets;
• long-term memory, pgvector, and group-chat privacy boundaries;
• file/document ingestion and media processing;
• Docker/VPS deployment configuration.

The maintainer will triage security reports by reproducibility and impact. Critical auth, secret-handling, or remote-execution findings take priority over general hardening requests. Accepted fixes should include a regression test when practical and should not disclose exploit details in commit messages.