This repository is the public, versioned index of plugins installable by the AIOX Cockpit
(Ajuda ▾ → Plugins). It is deliberately separate from the product repository — the product
repo is never referenced here in a way that would grant read access to its private content — so
that publishing a plugin never exposes product source, and installing a plugin never depends on
the product repository continuing to exist.
Decision record: ADR-COCKPIT-ENTERPRISE-PREMIUM-PACK, decisions D15–D24 (catalog: D22; namespace
- declared shadowing: D23; the three no-going-back invariants: D24). This repo implements the catalog side of those decisions; the Cockpit-side consumer lives in the product repo.
| Path | What | Status |
|---|---|---|
schema/index-entry.schema.json |
The versioned schema every index entry MUST conform to (AC2) | Enforced by CI (structural check) |
index/index.json |
The production index. Ships empty — see "Why the production index is empty" below | No real entries yet |
fixtures/ |
A non-production index + artifact used only to prove the publish pipeline works end-to-end | Test data, never consumed by a real client |
publisher/ |
The publish pipeline (publish.mjs) and the despublish pipeline (retire.mjs) — both AIOX-operated services, not a human PR workflow (AC5, D22) |
Full D24 invariant suite wired in (055.W3.3) |
lib/entry-schema.mjs |
Shared validation (shape, artifact-identity binding, artifact-host allowlist, id-immutability, burned-name, tier-vocabulary) — imported by BOTH publisher/publish.mjs and scripts/validate-index.mjs/scripts/check-ledger-consistency.mjs |
Enforced publish-time AND in CI |
lib/license-check.mjs |
Opens the artifact tarball and verifies a license file at the package root (D24(c)) | Enforced publish-time |
lib/ledger.mjs |
The persistent, append-only registry of every plugin_id ever published (ledger/plugin-ids.json) — survives an index entry's removal (VC-1) |
— |
ledger/plugin-ids.json |
The ledger itself. Ships with zero real plugins, matching the production index | Append-only, proved across its entire git history |
scripts/check-ledger-append-only.mjs |
CI proof that the ledger's git history never removed/mutated an existing record | Run on every push |
scripts/check-ledger-consistency.mjs |
CI structural re-check of id-immutability/burned-name against index/index.json, independent of publish-time |
Run on every push |
test/ |
Automated unit tests (node:test, zero dependency) for lib/, the publish.mjs/retire.mjs CLIs, render-catalog.mjs, and the ledger checks |
Run on every push (ci.yml) |
docs/CATALOG-AND-MIRROR.md |
How the index, the R2 artifact mirror, and the publish pipeline fit together | — |
docs/SCHEMA.md |
Field-by-field explanation of the index entry schema | — |
docs/INVARIANTS.md |
The four no-going-back invariants (D24 a/b/c + D21's AC8), how each is verified, and the explicitly-named design boundaries |
— |
lib/secret-rules.mjs |
The vendored gitleaks rule corpus (MIT, a dated snapshot of a named upstream ref) — 14 rules across 14 covered classes, plus what was deliberately left out and why | Enforced publish-time AND in CI (055.W4.1) |
lib/secret-scanner.mjs |
The engine that runs those rules over the manifest and the artifact's real bytes, with its blind spots attached to every report | Enforced publish-time AND in CI |
lib/pin.mjs |
Version pin resolution (<plugin_id>@<version> → digest) — a pure function of (index, pin), which is what makes it deterministic and channel-independent at once |
— |
scripts/check-channel-separation.mjs |
CI proof that no executable file here reads binary-channel state (D19 / AC5) | Run on every push |
docs/SECRET-SCANNING.md |
What the blocking scanner catches, why the rules are vendored rather than depended on, and — the important part — what it does not see | — |
docs/PIN-AND-CHANNEL.md |
The pin, its determinism proof, its cost, and the plugin channel's independence from the binary channel | — |
A package containing a recognisable credential does not publish — failure, not warning, with no flag or environment variable that disables it. The scan covers the manifest (which becomes a public catalog entry) and the artifact's real bytes (what a client downloads and runs), using a vendored subset of gitleaks' rule corpus so the detection patterns are reused rather than reinvented.
node scripts/scan-secrets.mjs --artifact <plugin.tar.gz>
node scripts/scan-secrets.mjs --manifest <manifest.json> --jsonRead docs/SECRET-SCANNING.md §5 before treating a clean scan as a safety verdict. In
particular: the scan inspects the published manifest and artifact, not the target of an MCP
pointer resolved at runtime ({command, args}, typically npx <package>), and an obfuscated or
encoded secret escapes it entirely. Those limits are printed on every run, including successful
ones.
A member the scan cannot read — binary, oversized, a duplicate/shadowed path, or a non-regular member — blocks the publish rather than being skipped: unscannable is treated as not publishable (§5.1), and the inventory comes from the archive's own member table, not from what survives extraction (§5.2).
<plugin_id>@<version> resolves to a digest; the mirror path is content-addressed, so the same
pin yields the same bytes. The plugin's update cycle is independent of the cockpit binary's
(ADR-COCKPIT-UPDATE-CHANNELS, epic 017 — reused as a concept, never reimplemented here), and CI
enforces that no file in this repo reads binary-channel state.
node scripts/resolve-pin.mjs --index index/index.json --pin sinkra-os@1.2.0 [--verify ./downloaded.tar.gz]The pin is not pure gain. It freezes an install — which also means an already-installed artifact
cannot be repaired by a later corrected build. Index freshness (055.W5.1, D20(5)) is what gives
that capability back. The cost is carried on every resolution and printed in every output mode; the
reasoning is in docs/PIN-AND-CHANNEL.md §2.
Every publishable skill MUST declare allowed-tools (kebab-case; comma/space string or YAML list).
Publishing without it fails, unconditionally. Capabilities shown to the user are DERIVED by
AIOX-side static analysis from the artifact's bytes — the publisher has no field in which to
declare them, and a manifest that tries is refused.
This delivers visibility, not containment: nothing here sandboxes a plugin. v1 warns and displays; the blocking path exists in code, off by configuration, with the documented trigger "when opening to externals".
node scripts/analyze-capabilities.mjs --artifact <plugin.tar.gz> --require-allowed-tools
node scripts/analyze-capabilities.mjs --dir <skills-dir> --jsonFull design reasoning, the two signals, and what the analysis cannot see: docs/CAPABILITIES.md.
node --test test/*.test.mjsNode's built-in test runner — zero dependency added to a scaffolding repo. Covers: every refusal
path in lib/entry-schema.mjs (artifact-identity binding, artifact-host allowlist, the D24
duplicate/immutability guard, shape validation), escapeMd's HTML/Markdown/injection neutralization
plus AC9 legibility for benign input, renderCatalog's positive/negative shadow-warning cases, the
publish.mjs CLI end to end (always with --no-push — no test ever runs git commit/git push),
validate-index.mjs's CI-side gate, and a regression pin that index/index.json (production) stays
empty (VC-5). Wired into .github/workflows/ci.yml, runs on every push and PR.
Three invariants have to exist before the first real publication, because they are
irreversible after it (D24): the plugin id becomes immutable (enforced against each entry's
lineage_id, its stable identity across version bumps — see docs/INVARIANTS.md "Check (a)"), a
retired plugin_id is burned forever (never reused by any publisher, enforced by the
persistent ledger — see docs/INVARIANTS.md "Check (b)"), and a license becomes mandatory at the
package root. The same "before it exists, it costs nothing" logic is why the entry schema went
1.0.0 -> 2.0.0 inside this story: adding the required lineage_id was free while this index was
still empty, and would have been a migration of an artifact every offline client pins by digest one
publication later. A fourth, the publish-time half of
D21 (AC8), was moved into the same story so a typo'd tier fails at publish, not on a paying
client's machine. The CI that verifies all four now exists (055.W3.3 — see
docs/INVARIANTS.md), but the first real publication is still a deliberate, separate authorization
this story's own dispatch did not grant: index/index.json therefore continues to ship with zero
entries; fixtures/index.json proves the pipeline against disposable data instead.
The right to publish is itself an entitlement (D16). The identity recorded on every entry is the
entitlement subject (publisher.subject) — never a GitHub handle — because it is the same
mechanism that already proves payment and provisioning. See publisher/README.md for how the
pipeline is invoked and what it assumes about that identity today. (publisher/retire.mjs,
055.W3.3, is the one deliberate exception to "nothing removes an entry" — see "Despublishing" below
and docs/INVARIANTS.md; it does not act on identity, and it is distinct from the automatic index-
freshness/expiry mechanism of D20(5), which still does not exist — see "What this repo does NOT do
(yet)".)
retire.mjs removes a plugin_id's entry from a target index file AND, in the same operation,
flips that plugin_id's record in ledger/plugin-ids.json to status: "retired" — see
docs/INVARIANTS.md "Check (b)" for why both writes always happen together. This is a manual,
explicit operation with a mandatory --reason; it is not the automatic index-freshness/expiry
mechanism of D20(5) (still 055.W5.1, still does not exist) — retiring a plugin here is a deliberate
act by whoever operates the pipeline, not something the system does on its own on a schedule or a
version pin.
Nothing in this repository is written by a human opening a pull request against it. The entry is
written by an AIOX-operated service (publisher/publish.mjs) that commits and pushes directly.
This is the other half of D22: the product repo's GitHub client (aiox-gh) is read-only by
construction, and a publish-by-PR flow would have collided with that. Writing the catalog from a
service, keyed by entitlement subject, dissolves the collision instead of reintroducing write
access into a crate that is deliberately read-only.
Artifacts are mirrored in Cloudflare R2 infrastructure already operated by AIOX (no new
infrastructure stood up for this repo) so that installing a plugin never depends on the author's
own repository staying online. See docs/CATALOG-AND-MIRROR.md for the bucket, the path
convention, and how a client is expected to verify what it downloads.
main has branch protection (verify: gh api repos/SynkraAI/aiox-plugins/branches/main/protection).
What is on, what is deliberately off, and why:
| Setting | Value | Why |
|---|---|---|
allow_force_pushes |
off | The commit history (every real publish) can't be rewritten. |
allow_deletions |
off | main can't be deleted out from under installed clients. |
required_linear_history |
on | No merge commits muddying the index's history. |
required_status_checks |
on, contexts: ["validate"], strict |
If a PR is ever opened against this repo (e.g. by a human collaborator, since the publisher never opens one), CI must pass before it can merge. |
required_pull_request_reviews |
off, deliberately | Turning this on would require EVERY change — including publisher/publish.mjs's own direct commits — to go through a PR, which contradicts D22 (the publisher does not open a PR). This is the one setting NOT applied, and it's the reason the two facts ("branch is protected" and "the publisher pushes straight to main") are not in tension. |
enforce_admins |
off | Consistent with the row above — nothing here should silently start blocking the publisher. |
restrictions (who may push) |
not set (any collaborator with write access) | There is currently no distinct machine identity to name here — see the backlog card below. |
What this protects against, concretely: nobody (accidentally or otherwise) rewrites or deletes
the published history. What it does NOT protect against yet: a human collaborator with write
access hand-editing index/index.json directly, bypassing publisher/publish.mjs's validation
(schema, artifact-identity binding, D24 duplicate guard) entirely — CI would catch it, but only
after the push lands, not as a merge gate, because there is no PR step to gate. Closing that gap needs a distinct service credential that restrictions can name instead of "anyone
with write" — tracked, not fixed here, as a backlog card in the product repo (a founder-level
infra/cost decision, not a catalog-repo code change; not linked from here, consistent with this
repo never referencing the product repo, AC1).
- It does not perform automatic pruning, removal, or revocation of a published entry based on
freshness/staleness. That capability (index freshness + monotonic version, D20(5)) is scoped to a
later story (
055.W5.1) and does not exist here. What this repo DOES have, as of055.W3.3, ispublisher/retire.mjs— a manual, explicit despublish operation with a mandatory reason, needed to make check (b)'s "burned name" invariant provable at all (see "Despublishing" above anddocs/INVARIANTS.md). Neither retirement nor anything else here acts based on entitlement/identity — see the "Identity" section above. - It does not sign the index. Signing (D20(3)) is a separate story (
055.W4.3) with its own key material, deliberately kept in a vault separate from the entitlement signing key. - It does not run the secret-scanning / capability-analysis / version-pin checks of D20(1)(2)(4).
Those are
055.W4.1/055.W4.2.