Do not open a public issue for a security problem. Email mayonej@wit.edu, or send a direct message to a DNS Manager in the club Discord.

Tell us what you found and how to reproduce it. We will reply within a few days.

This repository controls DNS for witcc.dev and hackwit.org. Somebody who can change a record can point a club name at a host they control. Treat these as serious:

• A way to make a workflow run code from a pull request while it holds a Cloudflare token.
• A way to merge to main without an approving review from a DNS Manager.
• A leaked Cloudflare token.

plan.yml runs on pull_request_target, so it can read secrets even for a pull request from a fork. It only stays safe because of one rule:

It checks out main and runs main's scripts. From the pull request it copies only the zone files at the repository root, which are data.

Anything that runs code, an action, or a dependency install from the pull request breaks that rule and hands the Cloudflare token to whoever opened the pull request. validate.yml is the workflow that runs against pull request code, and it holds no secrets.

The token used for a plan is read only. Only deploy.yml, which runs after a merge, uses a token that can write.

1. Delete the token in the Cloudflare dashboard. This takes effect at once.

2. Create a new one and update the repository secret.

3. Compare Cloudflare against this repository:

   $ gh workflow run sync-from-cloudflare.yml

   Any record an attacker added shows up in the pull request it opens.

4. Check the Cloudflare audit log for what the token did.