Weekly portage-stable package updates 2026-10-26

sdk_container/src/third_party/portage-stable/app-admin/logrotate/logrotate-3.22.0-r1.ebuild

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ else
 	SRC_URI="https://github.com/${PN}/${PN}/releases/download/${PV}/${P}.tar.xz"
 	SRC_URI+=" verify-sig? ( https://github.com/${PN}/${PN}/releases/download/${PV}/${P}.tar.xz.asc )"
 
-	KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~m68k ~mips ppc ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc x86"
+	KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 arm arm64 ~hppa ~m68k ~mips ppc ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc x86"
 
 	BDEPEND="verify-sig? ( sec-keys/openpgp-keys-cgzones )"
 fi

sdk_container/src/third_party/portage-stable/app-admin/sudo/files/CVE-2026-96512.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff --git a/src/sudo.c b/src/sudo.c
+index 0ed053839..89d97b6e8 100644
+--- a/src/sudo.c
++++ b/src/sudo.c
+@@ -341,13 +341,48 @@ access_denied:
+     return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Set the time zone using tzset(3), removing the user's TZ
++ * environment variable.  The original value of TZ may still
++ * be present in the command's environment, depending on sudoers.
++ */
++static void
++set_time_zone(void)
++{
++    /* Use system time zone, not user-specified. */
++    unsetenv("TZ");
++    (void) tzset();
++}
++
+ int
+ os_init_common(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
+ {
++    extern char **environ;
++    int envc;
+ #ifdef STATIC_SUDOERS_PLUGIN
+     preload_static_symbols();
+ #endif
+     gc_init();
++
++    /*
++     * Make a copy of environ[] that is distinct from envp[].
++     * This allows us to remove variables from sudo's environment
++     * while still providing the original envp to the plugins.
++     */
++    for (envc = 0; envp[envc] != NULL; envc++)
++	continue;
++    if (envc != 0) {
++	char **new_env = reallocarray(NULL, sizeof(char *), envc + 1);
++	if (new_env == NULL || !gc_add(GC_PTR, new_env)) {
++	    sudo_fatalx_nodebug(U_("%s: %s"), __func__,
++		U_("unable to allocate memory"));
++	}
++	for (envc = 0; envp[envc] != NULL; envc++)
++	    new_env[envc] = envp[envc];
++	new_env[envc] = NULL;
++	environ = new_env;
++    }
++
+     return 0;
+ }
+

sdk_container/src/third_party/portage-stable/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.9.17_p2-openssl-4.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From f97a34bc7b390f185d544e21b0ef75db1275953e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2025 12:28:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Use accessor for getting an ASN1_STRING's length
+
+OpensSSL 4 has plans to make ASN1_STRING opaque [1]. hostcheck.c's code
+mostly treats it as opaque, but accesses two lengths. This is API added
+in OpenSSL 0.9.0, so I'm not sure we need a configure check.
+
+WolfSSL only recently const corrected ASN1_STRING_length(), so maybe
+there will be a need to cast away const.
+
+[1]: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/29117
+
+--- a/lib/iolog/hostcheck.c
++++ b/lib/iolog/hostcheck.c
+@@ -323,14 +323,14 @@
+ #endif
+
+             /* IPV4 address */
+-            if(current_name->d.iPAddress->length == 4) {
++            if(ASN1_STRING_length(current_name->d.iPAddress) == 4) {
+                 if (inet_ntop(AF_INET, san_ip, san_ip_str, INET_ADDRSTRLEN) == NULL) {
+                     result = MalformedCertificate;
+                     break;
+                 }
+ #if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR)
+             /* IPV6 address */
+-            } else if (current_name->d.iPAddress->length == 16) {
++            } else if (ASN1_STRING_length(current_name->d.iPAddress) == 16) {
+                 if (inet_ntop(AF_INET6, san_ip, san_ip_str, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN) == NULL) {
+                     result = MalformedCertificate;
+                     break;

sdk_container/src/third_party/portage-stable/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.9.17_p2-r1.ebuild

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2026 Gentoo Authors
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+EAPI=8
+
+inherit pam tmpfiles toolchain-funcs
+
+MY_P="${P/_/}"
+MY_P="${MY_P/beta/b}"
+
+DESCRIPTION="Allows users or groups to run commands as other users"
+HOMEPAGE="https://www.sudo.ws/"
+
+if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then
+	EGIT_REPO_URI="
+		https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo
+		https://git.sudo.ws/sudo
+	"
+	inherit autotools git-r3
+else
+	VERIFY_SIG_OPENPGP_KEY_PATH=/usr/share/openpgp-keys/sudo.ws.asc
+	inherit libtool verify-sig
+
+	uri_prefix=
+	case ${P} in
+		*_beta*|*_rc*) uri_prefix=beta/ ;;
+	esac
+
+	SRC_URI="
+		https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz
+		verify-sig? (
+			https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz.sig
+		)
+	"
+
+	if [[ ${PV} != *_beta* && ${PV} != *_rc* ]] ; then
+		KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86"
+	fi
+
+	BDEPEND="verify-sig? ( sec-keys/openpgp-keys-sudo )"
+fi
+
+S="${WORKDIR}/${MY_P}"
+
+# Basic license is ISC-style as-is, some files are released under
+# 3-clause BSD license
+LICENSE="ISC BSD"
+SLOT="0"
+IUSE="gcrypt ldap nls offensive pam sasl +secure-path selinux +sendmail skey ssl sssd"
+
+DEPEND="
+	virtual/zlib:=
+	virtual/libcrypt:=
+	gcrypt? ( dev-libs/libgcrypt:= )
+	ldap? (
+		>=net-nds/openldap-2.1.30-r1:=
+		sasl? (
+			dev-libs/cyrus-sasl
+			net-nds/openldap:=[sasl]
+		)
+	)
+	pam? ( sys-libs/pam )
+	sasl? ( dev-libs/cyrus-sasl )
+	selinux? ( sys-libs/libselinux )
+	skey? ( >=sys-auth/skey-1.1.5-r1 )
+	ssl? ( dev-libs/openssl:= )
+	sssd? ( sys-auth/sssd[sudo(+)] )
+"
+RDEPEND="
+	${DEPEND}
+	>=app-misc/editor-wrapper-3
+	virtual/editor
+	ldap? ( dev-lang/perl )
+	pam? ( sys-auth/pambase )
+	selinux? ( sec-policy/selinux-sudo )
+	sendmail? ( virtual/mta )
+"
+BDEPEND+="
+	app-alternatives/yacc
+	virtual/pkgconfig
+"
+
+REQUIRED_USE="
+	?? ( pam skey )
+	?? ( gcrypt ssl )
+"
+
+MAKEOPTS+=" SAMPLES="
+
+PATCHES=(
+	"${FILESDIR}/CVE-2026-96512.patch"
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-openssl-4.patch
+)
+
+src_prepare() {
+	default
+
+	if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then
+		eautoreconf
+	else
+		elibtoolize
+	fi
+}
+
+set_secure_path() {
+	# First extract the default ROOTPATH from build env
+	SECURE_PATH=$(unset ROOTPATH; . "${EPREFIX}"/etc/profile.env; echo "${ROOTPATH}")
+
+	case "${SECURE_PATH}" in
+		*/usr/sbin*)
+			;;
+		*)
+			SECURE_PATH=$(unset PATH; . "${EPREFIX}"/etc/profile.env; echo "${PATH}")
+			;;
+	esac
+
+	if [[ -z ${SECURE_PATH} ]] ; then
+		ewarn "	Failed to detect SECURE_PATH, please report this"
+	fi
+
+	# Then remove duplicate path entries
+	cleanpath() {
+		local newpath thisp IFS=:
+		for thisp in $1 ; do
+			if [[ :${newpath}: != *:${thisp}:* ]] ; then
+				newpath+=:${thisp}
+			else
+				einfo "   Duplicate entry ${thisp} removed..."
+			fi
+		done
+		SECURE_PATH=${newpath#:}
+	}
+	cleanpath /usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/opt/bin${SECURE_PATH:+:${SECURE_PATH}}
+
+	# Finally, strip gcc paths, bug #136027
+	rmpath() {
+		local e newpath thisp IFS=:
+		for thisp in ${SECURE_PATH} ; do
+			for e ; do
+				[[ ${thisp} == ${e} ]] && continue 2 ;
+			done
+			newpath+=:${thisp}
+		done
+		SECURE_PATH=${newpath#:}
+	}
+	rmpath '*/gcc-bin/*' '*/gnat-gcc-bin/*' '*/gnat-gcc/*'
+}
+
+src_configure() {
+	local SECURE_PATH
+
+	set_secure_path
+
+	# bug #767712
+	tc-export PKG_CONFIG
+
+	# - audit: somebody got to explain me how I can test this before I
+	# enable it.. - Diego
+	# - plugindir: autoconf code is crappy and does not delay evaluation
+	# until `make` time, so we have to use a full path here rather than
+	# basing off other values.
+	local myeconfargs=(
+		# We set all of the relevant options by ourselves (patched
+		# into the toolchain) and setting these in the build system
+		# actually causes a downgrade when using e.g. -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3
+		# (it'll downgrade to =2). So, this has no functional effect on
+		# the hardening for users. It's safe.
+		--disable-hardening
+
+		# requires some python eclass
+		--disable-python
+		--enable-tmpfiles.d="${EPREFIX}"/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d
+		--enable-zlib=system
+		--with-editor="${EPREFIX}"/usr/libexec/editor
+		--with-env-editor
+		--with-plugindir="${EPREFIX}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/sudo
+		--with-rundir="${EPREFIX}"/run/sudo
+		--with-vardir="${EPREFIX}"/var/db/sudo
+		--without-linux-audit
+		--without-opie
+		$(use_enable gcrypt)
+		$(use_enable nls)
+		$(use_enable sasl)
+		$(use_enable ssl openssl)
+		$(use_with ldap)
+		$(use_with ldap ldap_conf_file /etc/ldap.conf.sudo)
+		$(use_with offensive insults)
+		$(use_with offensive all-insults)
+		$(use_with pam)
+		$(use_with pam pam-login)
+		$(use_with secure-path)
+		"$(use_with secure-path secure-path-value "${SECURE_PATH}")"
+		$(use_with selinux)
+		$(use_with sendmail)
+		$(use_with skey)
+		$(use_with sssd)
+	)
+
+	econf "${myeconfargs[@]}"
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	default
+
+	if use ldap ; then
+		dodoc README.LDAP.md
+
+		cat <<-EOF > "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo
+		# See ldap.conf(5) and README.LDAP.md for details
+		# This file should only be readable by root
+
+		# supported directives: host, port, ssl, ldap_version
+		# uri, binddn, bindpw, sudoers_base, sudoers_debug
+		# tls_{checkpeer,cacertfile,cacertdir,randfile,ciphers,cert,key}
+		EOF
+
+		if use sasl ; then
+			cat <<-EOF >> "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo
+
+			# SASL directives: use_sasl, sasl_mech, sasl_auth_id
+			# sasl_secprops, rootuse_sasl, rootsasl_auth_id, krb5_ccname
+			EOF
+		fi
+
+		insinto /etc
+		doins "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo
+		fperms 0440 /etc/ldap.conf.sudo
+
+		insinto /etc/openldap/schema
+		newins docs/schema.OpenLDAP sudo.schema
+	fi
+
+	if use pam ; then
+		pamd_mimic system-auth sudo auth account session
+		pamd_mimic system-auth sudo-i auth account session
+	fi
+
+	keepdir /var/db/sudo/lectured
+	fperms 0700 /var/db/sudo/lectured
+	# bug #652958
+	fperms 0711 /var/db/sudo
+
+	# Don't install into /run as that is a tmpfs most of the time
+	# (bug #504854)
+	rm -rf "${ED}"/run || die
+
+	# bug #697812
+	find "${ED}" -type f -name "*.la" -delete || die
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	tmpfiles_process sudo.conf
+
+	# bug #652958
+	local sudo_db="${EROOT}/var/db/sudo"
+	if [[ "$(stat -c %a "${sudo_db}")" -ne 711 ]] ; then
+		chmod 711 "${sudo_db}" || die
+	fi
+
+	if use ldap ; then
+		ewarn
+		ewarn "sudo uses the ${ROOT}/etc/ldap.conf.sudo file for ldap configuration."
+		ewarn
+		if grep -qs '^[[:space:]]*sudoers:' "${ROOT}"/etc/nsswitch.conf ; then
+			ewarn "In 1.7 series, LDAP is no more consulted, unless explicitly"
+			ewarn "configured in ${ROOT}/etc/nsswitch.conf."
+			ewarn
+			ewarn "To make use of LDAP, add this line to your ${ROOT}/etc/nsswitch.conf:"
+			ewarn "  sudoers: ldap files"
+			ewarn
+		fi
+	fi
+	if use prefix ; then
+		ewarn
+		ewarn "To use sudo on Prefix, you need to change file ownership and permissions"
+		ewarn "with root privileges, as follows:"
+		ewarn
+		ewarn "  # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/usr/bin/sudo"
+		ewarn "  # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/usr/lib/sudo/sudoers.so"
+		ewarn "  # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/etc/sudoers"
+		ewarn "  # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/etc/sudoers.d"
+		ewarn "  # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/var/db/sudo"
+		ewarn "  # chmod 4111 ${EPREFIX}/usr/bin/sudo"
+		ewarn
+	fi
+
+	elog "To use the -A (askpass) option, you need to install a compatible"
+	elog "password program from the following list. Starred packages will"
+	elog "automatically register for the use with sudo (but will not force"
+	elog "the -A option):"
+	elog ""
+	elog " [*] net-misc/ssh-askpass-fullscreen"
+	elog "     net-misc/x11-ssh-askpass"
+	elog ""
+	elog "You can override the choice by setting the SUDO_ASKPASS environmnent"
+	elog "variable to the program you want to use."
+}