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[GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8] etcd: Watch API authorization bypass via open-ended range requests #10422

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[GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8] etcd: Watch API authorization bypass via open-ended range requests #10422

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8/GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8.json
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{
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"id": "GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8",
"modified": "2026-08-12T21:20:37Z",
"modified": "2026-08-12T21:20:38Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T22:38:22Z",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73499"
],
"summary": "etcd: Watch API authorization bypass via open-ended range requests",
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA user granted READ permission on a single, exact key can use the Watch gRPC API with `clientv3.WithFromKey()` (an open-ended, \"from this key to the end of the keyspace\" watch) to receive watch events for every key lexicographically greater than or equal to their permitted key — not just the one key they were granted. \n\nThis is an authorization bypass in etcd's RBAC enforcement for the Watch API; Range/Get and DeleteRange requests are not affected. It only affects clusters with authentication enabled — clusters running without auth already allow unrestricted read access.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nThis vulnerability is patched in the following versions:\n\n- etcd 3.7.1\n- etcd 3.6.14\n- etcd 3.5.33\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, the following mitigations reduce exposure:\n\n- Audit READ grants. Any READ grant — even on one key — can be leveraged via Watch to read everything after it. Review who holds READ permissions and revoke/tighten any you wouldn't trust with full read access.\n- Restrict network access. Limit which hosts can reach etcd's client (gRPC) port via firewall rules or network policy, reducing who can attempt exploitation.\n\n### Reporter\n\n- Luis Toro ([@lobuhi](https://github.com/lobuhi) on Github)\n- Anthropic and Adam Korczynski ([@AdamKorcz](https://github.com/AdamKorcz) on Github)",
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA user granted READ permission on a single, exact key can use the Watch gRPC API with `clientv3.WithFromKey()` (an open-ended, \"from this key to the end of the keyspace\" watch) to receive watch events for every key lexicographically greater than or equal to their permitted key — not just the one key they were granted. \n\nThis is an authorization bypass in etcd's RBAC enforcement for the Watch API; Range/Get and DeleteRange requests are not affected. It only affects clusters with authentication enabled — clusters running without auth already allow unrestricted read access.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nThis vulnerability is patched in the following versions:\n\n- etcd 3.7.19\n- etcd 3.6.14\n- etcd 3.5.33\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, the following mitigations reduce exposure:\n\n- Audit READ grants. Any READ grant — even on one key — can be leveraged via Watch to read everything after it. Review who holds READ permissions and revoke/tighten any you wouldn't trust with full read access.\n- Restrict network access. Limit which hosts can reach etcd's client (gRPC) port via firewall rules or network policy, reducing who can attempt exploitation.\n\n### Reporter\n\n- Luis Toro ([@lobuhi](https://github.com/lobuhi) on Github)\n- Anthropic and Adam Korczynski ([@AdamKorcz](https://github.com/AdamKorcz) on Github)",
"severity": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
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