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Security: profullstack/c0mpute

Security

SECURITY.md

Security

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately through GitHub security advisories rather than a public issue.

Release signing

Every artifact a c0mpute release is installed from has a minisign signature next to it, <artifact>.minisig:

Artifact What it is
c0mpute-<os>-<arch>.tar.gz, c0mpute-windows-x86_64.zip the c0mpute binary
c0mpute-plugins.tar.gz every plugins/<id>/install.sh (and its module.toml) of that tag
c0mpute-tui.tar.gz the terminal UI source (apps/tui: src/, package.json, tsconfig.json)
c0mpute-desktop-*.{AppImage,deb,dmg,zip,exe} the desktop app builds

Public key (minisign.pub, key id 01A1B54137EC392A):

RWQqOew3QbWhAWH36TA5roreh18RgRqgozSwhE3yZtdza7eeLKmbDbJM

The signed (trusted) comment reads timestamp:<unix> version:<tag> file:<artifact>, so a signature only vouches for that one file of that one release.

What signs

The release workflow (.github/workflows/release.yml). The platform jobs build the binaries and the extras job packs the two archives from the tagged tree (scripts/pack-release-extras.sh; run it yourself to see exactly what ships). The publish job signs all of them and refuses to publish a release that is missing any binary, either archive, or any of their .minisig files. The desktop builds are made after the release is public and are signed by the desktop-sign job a few minutes later; until then they have no signature and the installer will not install them.

What verifies

  • scripts/install.sh (served at https://c0mpute.com/install.sh):
    • The binary. Downloads the artifact and its .minisig, verifies the signature with the embedded key and checks that the signed comment names the artifact (and the release tag when one was asked for). A missing signature, a failed verification or a mismatched comment aborts the install.
    • Which release. Everything else in the run comes from the release named in the binary's signed comment (or, when the binary is already installed, from that binary's own release), and each signature must be for that tag.
    • Plugin installers (coinpay, infernet, transcode) run from the verified c0mpute-plugins.tar.gz, and the TUI is installed from the verified c0mpute-tui.tar.gz. If an archive is on the release, a missing or bad signature aborts the install.
    • The desktop AppImage (--desktop) is verified the same way. No signature means it is not installed.
    • Releases up to v0.3.64 predate these signed extras. Only for those, and only when the release really does not have the asset (HTTP 404), the installer falls back to the old downloads (https://c0mpute.com/plugins/<id>/install.sh, the GitHub source tarball, the AppImage's .sha256) and prints a warning that they are unverified. On any newer release a missing extra is an error, so hiding the asset cannot force the fallback.
    • minisign. If minisign is not installed the script downloads the pinned upstream minisign 0.12 release and checks it against a hard-coded sha256 before running it (Linux x86_64/aarch64, macOS arm64; on Intel macs install minisign with brew install minisign).
    • bun (the runtime the TUI needs; only installed with the TUI). The script downloads the pinned upstream bun 1.3.14 release zip for the OS/arch and checks it against a hard-coded sha256 before unpacking it. It no longer pipes bun.sh/install to a shell, and it no longer installs mise at all (a contributor tool, not needed on a node). A platform without a pinned hash gets a message and no bun.
  • c0mpute self-update (node/crates/c0mpute-update) verifies the binary's signature with the key compiled into the binary, after the sha256 check and before swapping the binary. No signature or a bad one means no update.
  • c0mpute tui and c0mpute plugin install <id> download c0mpute-tui.tar.gz / c0mpute-plugins.tar.gz of the running binary's own release and verify them with that same compiled-in key (file and release tag included) before anything is unpacked or run. There is no unverified fallback.

C0MPUTE_ALLOW_UNSIGNED=1 makes the installer accept a missing signature. It never accepts a bad one.

Rollback: what latest does and does not promise

A signature proves an artifact is a real c0mpute release. It does not prove it is the newest one: whoever answers for https://c0mpute.com/releases/latest/ (a redirect to GitHub's latest release) could serve an older, genuinely signed release with a known bug.

What the installer does about it, without trusting a second server: it reads the release version out of the signed comment, prints it (installing c0mpute v<x.y.z>), and when you did not ask for a specific version it refuses to install a release older than the c0mpute already on the machine. C0MPUTE_VERSION=v<x.y.z> installs an older release on purpose. Self-update likewise only moves to a higher version.

What that does not prevent:

  • A first install has nothing to compare against, so it can still be handed an older signed release. Check the printed version against the releases page if that matters to you.
  • Being held at the current version (served the release you already have, never the newer one).

What is still not verified

  • install.sh itself is fetched over HTTPS from c0mpute.com; read it before piping it to sh if you prefer (curl -fsSL https://c0mpute.com/install.sh | less).
  • What the plugin installers fetch. The signed plugins/coinpay/install.sh and plugins/infernet/install.sh are thin wrappers that download and run the upstream installers (https://coinpayportal.com/install.sh, https://infernetprotocol.com/install.sh) over HTTPS; plugins/threatcrush/install.sh does the same for ThreatCrush. Those upstream scripts and what they install are not covered by the c0mpute signature. The transcode installer installs ffmpeg through your system package manager. The video installer pulls a container image pinned by digest, and builds from a clone of the repository's default branch if that pull fails.
  • The TUI's npm dependencies. The TUI source is signed, but bun install resolves its dependencies (@profullstack/hqtui and what it pulls in) from the npm registry at install time, without a lockfile.
  • c0mpute plugin install --unverified <https url> runs somebody else's script. It refuses without the flag and warns with it.
  • C0MPUTE_TUI_REF=<branch> (a developer override) installs the TUI from a branch tarball, with a warning.
  • The desktop app's own updater and the macOS/Windows builds' platform code signing (there are no certificates yet).

PATH, not root

The installer puts ~/.c0mpute/bin on your PATH through your shell's rc file and prints the line. It does not symlink the binary into /usr/local/bin with sudo any more: that put a program your account can rewrite on root's PATH. If an earlier install left such a symlink, the installer tells you; remove it with sudo rm /usr/local/bin/c0mpute /usr/local/bin/git-remote-c0mpute. (Run as root, the installer still links there, since root then owns the binary.) It does still write /etc/profile.d/c0mpute.sh, using sudo when it is available: one export PATH="$HOME/.c0mpute/bin:$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH" line, which for every account names that account's own home directory.

Verify a download by hand

minisign -Vm c0mpute-linux-x86_64.tar.gz -P RWQqOew3QbWhAWH36TA5roreh18RgRqgozSwhE3yZtdza7eeLKmbDbJM

There aren't any published security advisories