Please report security issues privately through GitHub security advisories rather than a public issue.
Every artifact a c0mpute release is
installed from has a minisign signature next to it,
<artifact>.minisig:
| Artifact | What it is |
|---|---|
c0mpute-<os>-<arch>.tar.gz, c0mpute-windows-x86_64.zip |
the c0mpute binary |
c0mpute-plugins.tar.gz |
every plugins/<id>/install.sh (and its module.toml) of that tag |
c0mpute-tui.tar.gz |
the terminal UI source (apps/tui: src/, package.json, tsconfig.json) |
c0mpute-desktop-*.{AppImage,deb,dmg,zip,exe} |
the desktop app builds |
Public key (minisign.pub, key id 01A1B54137EC392A):
RWQqOew3QbWhAWH36TA5roreh18RgRqgozSwhE3yZtdza7eeLKmbDbJM
The signed (trusted) comment reads timestamp:<unix> version:<tag> file:<artifact>, so a
signature only vouches for that one file of that one release.
The release workflow (.github/workflows/release.yml). The platform jobs build the
binaries and the extras job packs the two archives from the tagged tree
(scripts/pack-release-extras.sh; run it yourself to see exactly what ships). The publish
job signs all of them and refuses to publish a release that is missing any binary, either
archive, or any of their .minisig files. The desktop builds are made after the release is
public and are signed by the desktop-sign job a few minutes later; until then they have no
signature and the installer will not install them.
scripts/install.sh(served athttps://c0mpute.com/install.sh):- The binary. Downloads the artifact and its
.minisig, verifies the signature with the embedded key and checks that the signed comment names the artifact (and the release tag when one was asked for). A missing signature, a failed verification or a mismatched comment aborts the install. - Which release. Everything else in the run comes from the release named in the binary's signed comment (or, when the binary is already installed, from that binary's own release), and each signature must be for that tag.
- Plugin installers (coinpay, infernet, transcode) run from the verified
c0mpute-plugins.tar.gz, and the TUI is installed from the verifiedc0mpute-tui.tar.gz. If an archive is on the release, a missing or bad signature aborts the install. - The desktop AppImage (
--desktop) is verified the same way. No signature means it is not installed. - Releases up to v0.3.64 predate these signed extras. Only for those, and only when
the release really does not have the asset (HTTP 404), the installer falls back to the
old downloads (
https://c0mpute.com/plugins/<id>/install.sh, the GitHub source tarball, the AppImage's.sha256) and prints a warning that they are unverified. On any newer release a missing extra is an error, so hiding the asset cannot force the fallback. - minisign. If
minisignis not installed the script downloads the pinned upstream minisign 0.12 release and checks it against a hard-coded sha256 before running it (Linux x86_64/aarch64, macOS arm64; on Intel macs install minisign withbrew install minisign). - bun (the runtime the TUI needs; only installed with the TUI). The script downloads
the pinned upstream bun 1.3.14 release zip for the OS/arch and checks it against a
hard-coded sha256 before unpacking it. It no longer pipes
bun.sh/installto a shell, and it no longer installs mise at all (a contributor tool, not needed on a node). A platform without a pinned hash gets a message and no bun.
- The binary. Downloads the artifact and its
c0mputeself-update (node/crates/c0mpute-update) verifies the binary's signature with the key compiled into the binary, after the sha256 check and before swapping the binary. No signature or a bad one means no update.c0mpute tuiandc0mpute plugin install <id>downloadc0mpute-tui.tar.gz/c0mpute-plugins.tar.gzof the running binary's own release and verify them with that same compiled-in key (file and release tag included) before anything is unpacked or run. There is no unverified fallback.
C0MPUTE_ALLOW_UNSIGNED=1 makes the installer accept a missing signature. It never accepts
a bad one.
A signature proves an artifact is a real c0mpute release. It does not prove it is the newest
one: whoever answers for https://c0mpute.com/releases/latest/ (a redirect to GitHub's
latest release) could serve an older, genuinely signed release with a known bug.
What the installer does about it, without trusting a second server: it reads the release
version out of the signed comment, prints it (installing c0mpute v<x.y.z>), and when you
did not ask for a specific version it refuses to install a release older than the c0mpute
already on the machine. C0MPUTE_VERSION=v<x.y.z> installs an older release on purpose.
Self-update likewise only moves to a higher version.
What that does not prevent:
- A first install has nothing to compare against, so it can still be handed an older signed release. Check the printed version against the releases page if that matters to you.
- Being held at the current version (served the release you already have, never the newer one).
install.shitself is fetched over HTTPS from c0mpute.com; read it before piping it toshif you prefer (curl -fsSL https://c0mpute.com/install.sh | less).- What the plugin installers fetch. The signed
plugins/coinpay/install.shandplugins/infernet/install.share thin wrappers that download and run the upstream installers (https://coinpayportal.com/install.sh,https://infernetprotocol.com/install.sh) over HTTPS;plugins/threatcrush/install.shdoes the same for ThreatCrush. Those upstream scripts and what they install are not covered by the c0mpute signature. The transcode installer installs ffmpeg through your system package manager. The video installer pulls a container image pinned by digest, and builds from a clone of the repository's default branch if that pull fails. - The TUI's npm dependencies. The TUI source is signed, but
bun installresolves its dependencies (@profullstack/hqtuiand what it pulls in) from the npm registry at install time, without a lockfile. c0mpute plugin install --unverified <https url>runs somebody else's script. It refuses without the flag and warns with it.C0MPUTE_TUI_REF=<branch>(a developer override) installs the TUI from a branch tarball, with a warning.- The desktop app's own updater and the macOS/Windows builds' platform code signing (there are no certificates yet).
The installer puts ~/.c0mpute/bin on your PATH through your shell's rc file and prints the
line. It does not symlink the binary into /usr/local/bin with sudo any more: that put a
program your account can rewrite on root's PATH. If an earlier install left such a symlink,
the installer tells you; remove it with sudo rm /usr/local/bin/c0mpute /usr/local/bin/git-remote-c0mpute. (Run as root, the installer still links there, since root
then owns the binary.) It does still write /etc/profile.d/c0mpute.sh, using sudo when it is
available: one export PATH="$HOME/.c0mpute/bin:$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH" line, which for
every account names that account's own home directory.
minisign -Vm c0mpute-linux-x86_64.tar.gz -P RWQqOew3QbWhAWH36TA5roreh18RgRqgozSwhE3yZtdza7eeLKmbDbJM