feat(cloudflare): add WAF rulesets, rate limiting, Zero Trust Access, R2, Workers, and Tunnels by waleedlatif1 · Pull Request #6740 · simstudioai/sim

waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-15T22:57:14Z

Summary

Cloudflare goes from 13 to 47 tools: WAF/rulesets, rate limiting, Access (Zero Trust), R2, Workers, and Tunnels
Fixed a shipped-tool defaulting regression: a newly added Access type subBlock defaulting 'self_hosted' was overwriting the pre-existing DNS Record Type default of 'A'. SubBlock defaults are seeded into block state keyed by subBlock id, so the last definition in file order silently wins. Four ids were affected — the colliding controls now carry their own ids (recordType, recordProxied, certificateStatus, appType, rateLimitAction) and are remapped back to their tool param names at the top of tools.config.params, before any coercion runs, so no alias id reaches a tool. Regression test added
Removed 25 any occurrences from the tool layer, which surfaced four real output-shape mismatches between transformResponse and the declared outputs

Deliberate omissions

Firewall/security events are not implemented. The REST endpoint was deprecated in 2020, and the GraphQL firewallEventsAdaptive dataset has no published field reference — implementing it would require live schema introspection rather than documented behavior
Enterprise complexity-based rate limiting (score_per_period, score_response_header_name) is left out

Type of Change

New feature
Bug fix

Testing

Tested manually. 9 subBlock-collision tests added and passing; docs, tool metadata, and integration catalog regenerated and verified in sync.

Checklist

Code follows project style guidelines
Self-reviewed my changes
Tests added/updated and passing
No new warnings introduced
I confirm that I have read and agree to the terms outlined in the Contributor License Agreement (CLA)

vercel · 2026-08-15T22:57:20Z

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cursor · 2026-08-15T22:57:26Z

PR Summary

High Risk
Many new operations change live WAF, Access, and rate-limit behavior on production zones; mistaken params can remove protection or widen access immediately. Mapper/alias logic is security-sensitive but covered by new tests.

Overview
Expands the Cloudflare integration from 13 to 48 operations, with docs and catalog updates. New coverage includes WAF rulesets (custom/managed rules, overrides), Rulesets-based rate limiting, Cloudflare Access (apps, policies, groups, IdPs, service tokens), R2 buckets, Workers (scripts, routes, settings), and Tunnels (list/get/config). Integration copy now emphasizes WAF, Zero Trust, and edge infrastructure instead of DNS/cache only.

Fixes a subBlock default collision bug: block state is keyed by subBlock id, so reused ids (e.g. type, status, proxied) let later controls overwrite earlier defaults—Access self_hosted could replace DNS record type A. Colliding controls now use dedicated ids (recordType, certificateStatus, rateLimitAction, etc.) and SUBBLOCK_ALIASES remaps them to tool params before coercion; alias ids are cleared so they never leak as API params. Update flows for Access apps/policies and rate limits avoid seeded defaults on full-replace endpoints.

Adds cloudflare.test.ts with regression tests for defaults, aliases, read-vs-write id reuse, and advanced hidden controls that could serialize stale values across operations. Templates/skills for WAF rollout, rate limits, and Access review are included.

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 81b5a61. Configure here.}

greptile-apps · 2026-08-15T23:00:31Z

Greptile Summary

The PR expands the Cloudflare integration with WAF rulesets, rate limiting, Zero Trust Access, R2, Workers, and Tunnels while correcting conflicting subBlock defaults.

Adds and registers 34 Cloudflare operations with generated metadata, outputs, integration catalog entries, and documentation.
Introduces operation-specific subBlock aliases that are remapped to tool parameter names before execution.
Adds regression coverage for conflicting defaults, alias remapping, and Cloudflare block configuration invariants.

Confidence Score: 5/5

The PR appears safe to merge.

No blocking failure remains.

Important Files Changed

Filename	Overview
apps/sim/blocks/blocks/cloudflare.ts	Expands the Cloudflare block operation catalog and remaps uniquely identified controls before coercion to prevent conflicting seeded defaults.
apps/sim/tools/cloudflare/cloudflare.test.ts	Adds regression tests covering alias remapping, conflicting defaults, incompatible dropdown definitions, and hidden-control applicability.
apps/sim/tools/cloudflare/utils.ts	Provides shared request, response, and parsing utilities used by the expanded Cloudflare tool set.
apps/sim/tools/cloudflare/types.ts	Defines typed Cloudflare API envelopes and resource shapes used to replace loose tool-layer types.
apps/sim/tools/cloudflare/index.ts	Exports the expanded Cloudflare tool collection for registry integration.
apps/sim/tools/registry.ts	Registers the newly added Cloudflare operations in the application tool catalog.
apps/docs/content/docs/en/integrations/cloudflare.mdx	Documents the expanded Cloudflare operation set, inputs, outputs, permissions, and operational caveats.

Flowchart

%%{init: {'theme': 'neutral'}}%%
flowchart LR
  UI[Cloudflare block controls] --> State[Persisted subBlock state]
  State --> Params[tools.config.params]
  Params --> Alias[Operation-specific alias remapping]
  Alias --> Coerce[Parameter coercion]
  Coerce --> Tool[Selected Cloudflare tool]
  Tool --> API[Cloudflare API]
  API --> Transform[Response transformation]
  Transform --> Output[Workflow output]

_{Reviews (9): Last reviewed commit: "fix(cloudflare): stop the Access replace..." | Re-trigger Greptile}

waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-16T01:13:41Z

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waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-16T01:30:48Z

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waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-16T01:35:30Z

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waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-16T01:43:15Z

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… R2, Workers, and Tunnels Extends the Cloudflare integration past DNS/zones/cache with the security and Zero Trust surface: - Rulesets engine (zone-scoped): list rulesets, get a ruleset, read a phase entry point, and create/update/delete rules. WAF managed-rule overrides are surfaced through the http_request_firewall_managed entry point, since Cloudflare has no dedicated overrides endpoint. - Rate limiting (zone-scoped) via the current Rulesets-based http_ratelimit phase, not the deprecated rate_limits endpoint. - Cloudflare Access (account-scoped): applications, application policies, groups, identity providers, and service tokens. - R2 buckets, Workers scripts/routes, and cloudflared Tunnels. Destructive operations (delete application, delete policy, revoke service token, delete rule, delete bucket) spell out their blast radius, and every tool branches on the envelope's success flag rather than the HTTP status. Security events are intentionally omitted: Cloudflare exposes them only through the GraphQL firewallEventsAdaptive dataset, whose field list is not documented outside schema introspection.

Validation pass over all 47 Cloudflare tools against developers.cloudflare.com. - Two tool descriptions still escaped a quote as \'. That reaches the model verbatim and truncates the generated MDX cell — the get_zone_settings `value` output row was missing from the published docs entirely. Both are now template literals, and the row is back. - list_rulesets ignored pagination. The endpoint pages by cursor via result_info.cursors.after (not page/per_page), so a zone with many rulesets silently truncated with no way to page. Expose per_page + cursor and return the next cursor. - The managed-ruleset override description claimed action and enabled were the overridable properties. They are the ones the Rulesets engine documents at every level, but individual managed rulesets add more: an OWASP Core Ruleset rule override also takes score_threshold. Corrected in both the tool output description and the block's action-parameters wand prompt. (sensitivity_level is a DDoS override, not a WAF one — deliberately absent.) - list_tunnels/get_tunnel dropped the documented `metadata` field. - list_r2_buckets appended order=name whenever any filter was set. `order` only qualifies `direction`, and `name` is its sole documented value. - Path-interpolated IDs are trimmed, so a pasted ID with trailing whitespace no longer 404s. - Replaced every `any` in the integration with checked types: a shared CloudflareEnvelope plus per-resource raw payload interfaces, read through readCloudflareResponse. The mappers in utils.ts were the widest hole — typing them caught four real output-shape mismatches (identity provider read_only, service token enabled, DNS record meta/priority, certificate geo_restrictions) that `any` had been hiding. - BlockMeta only described DNS and zone work. Added templates and skills for the WAF, rate limiting, and Zero Trust Access surfaces the block now has. Confirmed against the docs and left unchanged: rulesets/rate limiting are zone-scoped and Access/R2/Workers scripts/Tunnels are account-scoped while Workers routes are zone-scoped; tunnels live under /accounts/{id}/cfd_tunnel; the ratelimit object is a sibling of action/expression, not nested in action_parameters; every rate limiting period and mitigation_timeout option matches the documented set; R2 delete returns an empty result so echoing the requested bucket name is correct; app-nested Access policy endpoints are current, not deprecated; and every tool fails on a 200 carrying success:false.

…shared id Subblock initial values are seeded into block state keyed by subblock id — both stores/workflows/utils.ts and lib/workflows/defaults.ts assign `subBlocks[subBlock.id]` in a plain forEach — so two controls sharing an id leave one stored value and the last definition in file order wins. Four ids were duplicated with differing defaults: - `type` was defined four times. The Access "Application Type" control is last, so every new block seeded `type = 'self_hosted'` and the three DNS record controls inherited it — Create DNS Record sent a Zero Trust application type as its record type. The subblock added on this branch broke a default on tools that shipped long before it. - `status` was defined three times. The empty tunnel filter is last, so List Certificates lost its `all` default. - `proxied` was defined three times. An empty filter is last, so Create DNS Record lost its explicit `false`. - `action` was defined twice. The rate limiting dropdown is last, so the ruleset-rule action input was seeded `block`, quietly making "block live traffic" the default for a WAF custom rule the user never configured. Give the colliding controls their own ids and map them back to the tool params per operation, ahead of the coercions that read them, so each operation keeps its own default. The other 17 duplicated ids agree on their value and are left shared. Adds tests covering each separated default plus a sweep asserting no id carries two different seeded values, so a future duplicate goes red.

… a phase ruleset The Access policy include wand asked for a JSON object while the tool parses the field with parseJsonArrayParam, so generated rules failed validation. Switch it to json-array, whose prompt reinforcement omits the object braces. Rate limiting and WAF custom rules could only be appended to an existing ruleset, but a zone that has never had a rule in a phase has no entry point ruleset and returns 404, leaving no way to add the first rule. Add cloudflare_create_ruleset for the documented POST /zones/{id}/rulesets bootstrap, seeded with optional initial rules.

…g into writes Independent re-validation of all 48 tools against developers.cloudflare.com turned up defects that the shipped tools would have hit on their happy path. Delete DNS record reported every success as a failure. That endpoint is the one Cloudflare v4 response with no envelope — its documented body is `{"result":{"id":...}}` with no `success` — so `!data.success` was always true. Branch on an explicit `=== false` instead. The two replace-semantics PATCH endpoints could silently destroy live config. Update rate limit rule defaulted a missing action to `block`, converting an existing `log` or challenge rule into a hard block on real traffic; update ruleset rule left action and expression optional and had no `ratelimit` or `logging` passthrough, so updating a rate limiting rule stopped it rate limiting. Both now require the fields the replacement needs, and the ruleset rule carries the two nested objects through. Access applications were unbuildable for most types: `domain` was required, but it does not exist on the saas, app_launcher, warp, biso, dash_sso, infrastructure, mcp, mcp_portal, or proxy_endpoint request variants. The application type enum was also six values behind. Access group `is_default` is an array of rule objects, not a boolean. Purge cache merged every supplied target into one body, but the purge body is a one-of over the five target kinds; it now names the conflict instead. The remaining fixes are documentation drift: the priority field is MX and URI only (an SRV record carries priority inside its content), the certificate status filter documents only "all", the Worker tag filter takes tag:allowed pairs, and the managed-rule override list conflated the DDoS-only sensitivity_level with the WAF rule-level set. Separately, controls that share a subBlock id share one stored value, and `shouldSerializeSubBlock` short-circuits on `mode: 'advanced'` before it evaluates `condition` — so a hidden list filter was reaching a write. A `list_dns_records` content filter could overwrite a record's content, cache tags could be written onto a DNS record, and the zone status enum could reach the tunnel list, whose enum is disjoint. Filters that differ from the value they collided with now carry their own id, remapped through one table before any coercion. Sharings that mean the same thing everywhere are unchanged. Aliases are cleared by explicit assignment rather than destructuring, because the executor merges the mapper's output over the raw inputs and a merely omitted key survives as its raw subBlock string. The tests assert on that merged result, and three mechanical invariants now go red on a new collision: no id spans a read filter and a written value, no dropdown id carries two option sets, and no hidden advanced control feeds an operation that cannot render it. That last one found the name filter reaching three list operations.

Cloudflare deprecated the field in favour of destinations, which the tools already surface. The output stays — Cloudflare still returns it — but the description now says which one to read.

create_dns_record now takes its record type from the recordType control, whose dropdown has no empty option, so the operation can never reach this guard with an empty type. Clear it unconditionally.

…trols The list filters that were split off their write-side twin kept their old ids in canvasPresentation, so seven clauses referenced a control that is no longer visible for that operation — check:canvas-sentences catches exactly this, and a broken clause fails silently on the card rather than throwing.

…ing update Making action required on update_rate_limit_rule was only half the fix: the Action dropdown still seeded block for the update operation too, so an update that edited only the threshold kept sending block and converted a live log or challenge rule into a hard block — exactly the harm the required flag was meant to prevent. The update now has its own control with no seeded value, so the action is something the caller states rather than inherits. The certificate status filter also still offered Active and Pending, which Cloudflare does not document for that endpoint; the only documented value is all, and omitting it returns active packs.

…cision Same class as the rate limiting action: both Access updates are full replacements, and the shared controls seeded self_hosted and allow for the update operations too. Editing only a policy's include rules would silently convert a live deny, bypass, or non_identity policy to allow — widening who gets in — and editing an application would rewrite what it IS. Each update now has its own required control with no seeded value, so the type and the decision are stated rather than inherited. Regression tests cover both, and the canvas sentence follows the renamed decision control.

greptile-apps Bot reviewed Aug 15, 2026

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cursor Bot reviewed Aug 15, 2026

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