Coverity fixes Harden TPM bounds and configuration paths

[aidangarske]

• 911493
• 912593
• 913183
• 913184
• 913340
• 913341

[Copilot]

🟡 Changes recommended

wolfTPM2_ST33_GetFwUpgradeCommands now dereferences caps unconditionally and forces haveFwVer=1, violating its documented/covered caps == NULL contract and risking a NULL-pointer crash.

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Pull request overview

This PR appears to address multiple Coverity findings by tightening bounds checks in TPM wrapper code paths, hardening packet/response boundary handling, and adjusting configuration/locking behavior in the core TPM2 context cleanup.

Changes:

• Add/strengthen bounds validation to prevent out-of-range writes and inconsistent session mutation (e.g., wolfTPM2_SetAuthHandle, wolfTPM2_PolicyPCRMake) and add unit tests for these edge cases.
• Refine cleanup-time locking behavior in TPM2_Cleanup to avoid acquiring/releasing an uninitialized mutex depending on build configuration.
• Adjust firmware TPM crypto/curve selection logic to reject unsupported ECC curves at compile-time thresholds.

File summaries

File	Description
tests/unit_tests.c	Adds coverage for wolfTPM2_SetAuthHandle policy-auth offset bounds and non-mutation on failure.
tests/fwtpm_unit_tests.c	Tightens PCR properties capability parsing boundary checks in test code.
src/tpm2.c	Introduces TPM2_DYNAMIC_HW_LOCK path to conditionally acquire/release the global HW lock during cleanup.
src/tpm2_wrap.c	Hardens bounds checks in wolfTPM2_SetAuthHandle and wolfTPM2_PolicyPCRMake; modifies ST33 FW upgrade command selection path.
src/fwtpm/fwtpm_crypto.c	Updates ECC curve mapping to reject curves below ECC_MIN_KEY_SZ using preprocessor checks.

Review details

• Files reviewed: 5/5 changed files
• Comments generated: 1
• Review effort level: Lite

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