fix(shell): refuse foreign requests at the network layer on Windows; release 0.3.1

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ name: Release
 # GitHub release for a v* tag. Publishing the draft stays a manual maintainer
 # step. Nothing here restores a cache: every package comes from a clean runner,
 # so a poisoned cache can never reach a release. Pull requests that touch the
-# pipeline run the build jobs only.
+# pipeline or the shell run the build jobs only; ci.yml builds on macOS alone,
+# so this is where Windows- and Linux-only shell code first compiles.
 on:
   push:
     tags: ['v*']
@@ -14,8 +15,8 @@ on:
       - .github/workflows/release.yml
       - scripts/release/**
       - scripts/sync-viewer.mjs
-      - src-tauri/tauri*.conf.json
-      - viewer-dist/manifest.json
+      - src-tauri/**
+      - viewer-dist/**
 
 concurrency:
   group: release-${{ github.ref }}

CLAUDE.md

@@ -82,6 +82,17 @@ the worker, the `ModificationTracker` undo/redo history, and file I/O via the br
   not cover navigation, so without it a compromised page exfiltrates through `location`.
   A plugin hook runs for every webview, so `db-<n>` windows cannot be built without it.
   `window.open` is already refused: no new-window handler is installed.
+- **Windows request pin** (`request_pin.rs`): WebView2 SENDS a refused navigation's request.
+  `NavigationStarting` is cancelled synchronously and the page stays, but `location.href`,
+  `location.assign`, link clicks and meta refresh still delivered their URL to a foreign
+  server (measured on WebView2 154; WKWebView and WebKitGTK sent nothing). So the same
+  plugin's `on_webview_ready` installs a `*` `WebResourceRequested` filter that answers
+  every web request (http/https/ws/wss) off `app_request_origins` with a local 403.
+  Only `data:`/`blob:`/`about:` pass; every other scheme is refused, `file:` included,
+  because a `file://host/` URI is a UNC/SMB connection that can leak NTLM credentials. wry's custom-protocol handler ignores foreign URIs,
+  so the two coexist. `the_request_pin_admits_what_the_csp_connects_to` keeps IPC admitted.
+  Verify Windows navigation claims by counting hits on a foreign listener, never by
+  checking whether the page moved.
 - **Capabilities are the real boundary** (`withGlobalTauri` hands the page the full
   `__TAURI__` surface, so `bridge.js` is hygiene, not a boundary). The set is exactly
   `core:event:allow-listen` + `allow-unlisten` (all the bridge's `listen` needs; every

README.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Linux and Windows. It shares its viewer with the
 [SQLite Explorer VS Code extension](https://github.com/zknpr/SQLite-Explorer)
 and runs in a Tauri desktop shell.
 
-The current desktop version is **0.3.0**, integrating the extension's **1.8.1**
+The current desktop version is **0.3.1**, integrating the extension's **1.8.1**
 release and desktop-specific fixes. Packages for macOS, Linux and Windows are
 attached to each [release](https://github.com/zknpr/SQLite-Explorer-App/releases);
 see [Install](#install). See [release readiness](docs/release-readiness.md) for

SECURITY.md

@@ -59,7 +59,10 @@ Out of scope:
 - Writes are atomic: an exclusive temporary file, `fsync`, then rename.
 - The CSP sets `default-src 'none'`, an eval-free `script-src`, and
   `base-uri`, `form-action` and `frame-ancestors` to `'none'`.
-- A navigation handler keeps every webview on the app's own origin.
+- A navigation handler keeps every webview on the app's own origin. On
+  Windows, WebView2 sends a cancelled navigation's request anyway, so a request
+  filter also refuses every web request to a host other than the app's own
+  before it leaves the machine.
 - The native engine refuses `ATTACH`/`DETACH`, and the shell re-checks the
   bound file's identity around every native call.
 

docs/release-readiness.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Release readiness
 
-Status checked October 8, 2026, for desktop 0.3.0 and the extension 1.8.1
+Status checked October 8, 2026, for desktop 0.3.1 and the extension 1.8.1
 integration. The source is public under MIT. Release packages are built by the
 [release workflow](../.github/workflows/release.yml); the gates below separate
 source publication from binary distribution.
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ downloaded package or close the macOS interaction gates.
 | Publicly retrievable viewer source pin | Public; fresh-clone sync verified for three targets as above |
 | Security policy | [SECURITY.md](../SECURITY.md), private vulnerability reporting |
 | Continuous integration | Apple Silicon macOS: manifest verification, script tests, shell unit tests, clippy. No Linux or Windows lane |
-| Navigation pin and CSP `base-uri`/`form-action`/`frame-ancestors` | Live-verified in an Apple Silicon macOS QA build against a pre-change control build. Linux and Windows runtime behaviour unverified |
+| Navigation pin and CSP `base-uri`/`form-action`/`frame-ancestors` | Verified against a foreign listener on installed packages. macOS: QA build against a pre-change control. Linux 0.3.0 `.deb`: no request left. Windows 0.3.0: the page stayed, but WebView2 still sent every refused navigation's request, so 0.3.0 was never published. Windows 0.3.1 adds the request pin: zero foreign requests for `location.href`/`assign`, link click and meta refresh, and `window.open` sends nothing |
 | Release pipeline | Builds macOS, Linux and Windows packages on their own OS from the viewer pin, with no cache, and drafts a release for a `v*` tag; a prerelease version drafts a prerelease. Each asset gets SHA256SUMS and a build-provenance attestation. Publishing is manual |
 | Third-party notices | Bundled inside every package; the release also attaches them with the MPL Cargo sources, which are checksum-verified against Cargo.lock |
 | AppImage distribution | Not distributed: its extra bundled Linux system libraries have no notice/source inventory. Linux ships as `.deb` |
 | Linux glibc floor | The native engine needs glibc 2.38 and the app built on Ubuntu 24.04 needs 2.39; the `.deb` declares `libc6 (>= 2.39)` and the workflow fails if any packaged binary needs more |
 | Final macOS installed-package checks | Open cases and older tested source are recorded in [macOS QA](macos-release-qa.md); rerun against the final candidate |
-| Linux/Windows installed-package checks | Passed for the packages and environments in [Linux/Windows QA](linux-windows-release-qa.md), including real shutdown/restart. Those packages predate the navigation pin and CSP change; rerun the affected checks on new packages |
+| Linux/Windows installed-package checks | The 0.2.0 packages passed the checks in [Linux/Windows QA](linux-windows-release-qa.md), including real shutdown/restart. Candidates: Linux 0.3.0 `.deb` (upgraded in place from 0.2.0) passed the 6 installed-app smoke checks; Windows 0.3.1 NSIS (upgraded from 0.3.0) passed them with the request pin active. Shutdown/restart was not rerun on these candidates |
 | Other Linux desktops, Wayland and physical keyboards | Unverified; limit platform claims to observed coverage |
 | Windows distribution | Unsigned. SignPath Foundation signing requires a prior public release, so the first release ships unsigned, then apply. Signing will cover the app and installer, not the upstream `tjs.exe`. Smart App Control blocks the unsigned installer; whether it blocks `tjs.exe` under a signed app (the app would fall back to WASM) is untested. SmartScreen on a clean machine unverified |
 | macOS distribution | The app has an ad-hoc signature with the hardened runtime, built by the workflow; the DMG is unsigned. No Developer ID signing or notarization, by choice. Gatekeeper's Open Anyway flow on a downloaded package unverified |

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "sqlite-explorer-desktop",
-  "version": "0.3.0",
+  "version": "0.3.1",
   "description": "SQLite Explorer desktop shell (Tauri v2) around the extension's desktop viewer artifacts",
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {

src-tauri/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "sqlite-explorer-desktop"
-version = "0.3.0"
+version = "0.3.1"
 description = "SQLite Explorer desktop shell"
 edition = "2021"
 license = "MIT"
@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ objc2 = "0.6.4"
 libc = "0.2"
 
 [target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
+# The request pin (src/request_pin.rs) talks to WebView2 directly. Both crates
+# are already in the lock underneath wry at these versions, so this adds no
+# package to the release graph.
+webview2-com = "0.38"
+windows = "0.61"
 # File IDs and change times from the same handle that supplied the bytes.
 windows-sys = { version = "0.60", features = ["Win32_Storage_FileSystem", "Win32_Foundation", "Win32_UI_Shell", "Win32_UI_WindowsAndMessaging", "Win32_System_Shutdown", "Win32_System_Threading"] }
 percent-encoding = "2"

src-tauri/src/lib.rs

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ mod native;
 #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
 mod linux_session;
 #[cfg(windows)]
+mod request_pin;
+#[cfg(windows)]
 mod windows_file_info;
 #[cfg(windows)]
 mod windows_session;
@@ -157,14 +159,66 @@ fn is_app_navigation(target: &tauri::Url, allowed: &[tauri::Url]) -> bool {
     })
 }
 
+/// The origins a webview may send network requests to: the asset origin and,
+/// on Windows, the IPC endpoint the bridge fetches (`connect-src` lists it). Only
+/// `request_pin` consults this; `the_request_pin_admits_what_the_csp_connects_to`
+/// holds it to the CSP.
+// Only `request_pin` (Windows) calls these three; the tests run everywhere.
+#[cfg_attr(not(windows), allow(dead_code))]
+fn app_request_origins() -> Vec<tauri::Url> {
+    vec![
+        served_origin(),
+        tauri::Url::parse("http://ipc.localhost").expect("static origin parses"),
+    ]
+}
+
+/// SECURITY: whether a webview request may proceed. Web schemes must target an
+/// app origin. Only schemes whose bytes come from the page itself (`data:`,
+/// `blob:`, `about:`) pass. Every other scheme is refused, because "not a web
+/// scheme" does not mean local: on Windows a `file://host/…` URI is a UNC path,
+/// an SMB connection to that host that can also hand it the user's NTLM
+/// credentials. On Windows the app's own custom protocols arrive as
+/// `http://<name>.localhost`, so nothing legitimate is lost. A URI that does not
+/// parse is refused.
+#[cfg_attr(not(windows), allow(dead_code))]
+fn is_app_request(target: &str, allowed: &[tauri::Url]) -> bool {
+    let Ok(url) = tauri::Url::parse(target) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    match url.scheme() {
+        "http" | "https" | "ws" | "wss" => is_app_navigation(&url, allowed),
+        "data" | "blob" | "about" => true,
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
+
+/// `scheme://host` of a refused URL for the log. The rest is whatever the page
+/// tried to smuggle out, and it does not belong in a log.
+#[cfg_attr(not(windows), allow(dead_code))]
+fn origin_for_log(target: &str) -> String {
+    match tauri::Url::parse(target) {
+        Ok(url) => format!("{}://{}", url.scheme(), url.host_str().unwrap_or("")),
+        Err(_) => "an unparseable URI".into(),
+    }
+}
+
 /// Installs `is_app_navigation` on EVERY webview, the config-declared window and
 /// the `db-<n>` windows alike: a plugin's navigation hook runs for each webview
 /// the app creates, so no window can be built without it. In a `tauri dev` build
 /// the page comes from `devUrl` instead (tauri's `get_app_url`), so that origin is
 /// admitted there and only there. `window.open` needs no hook — with no new-window
 /// handler installed, wry refuses every new-window request on all three platforms.
+///
+/// On Windows the navigation hook is not enough on its own: WebView2 has already
+/// sent a refused navigation's request when the cancel lands, so `request_pin`
+/// also refuses foreign requests at the network layer, installed on each webview
+/// as it becomes ready.
 fn navigation_pin<R: tauri::Runtime>() -> tauri::plugin::TauriPlugin<R> {
     tauri::plugin::Builder::new("navigation-pin")
+        .on_webview_ready(|_webview| {
+            #[cfg(windows)]
+            install_request_pin(&_webview);
+        })
         .on_navigation(|webview, url| {
             let mut allowed = vec![served_origin()];
             if tauri::is_dev() {
@@ -185,6 +239,26 @@ fn navigation_pin<R: tauri::Runtime>() -> tauri::plugin::TauriPlugin<R> {
         .build()
 }
 
+/// A webview without the request pin still has the navigation pin, so a failure
+/// here is reported, not fatal: closing the window would leave the app unusable
+/// on a WebView2 that lacks an API this needs.
+#[cfg(windows)]
+fn install_request_pin<R: tauri::Runtime>(webview: &tauri::Webview<R>) {
+    let mut allowed = app_request_origins();
+    if tauri::is_dev() {
+        allowed.extend(webview.config().build.dev_url.clone());
+    }
+    let label = webview.label().to_string();
+    let reached = webview.with_webview(move |platform| {
+        if let Err(e) = request_pin::install(platform.controller(), platform.environment(), allowed) {
+            eprintln!("could not install the request pin on webview {label}: {e}");
+        }
+    });
+    if let Err(e) = reached {
+        eprintln!("could not reach webview {} to install the request pin: {e}", webview.label());
+    }
+}
+
 /// Source of `db-<n>` labels. Monotonic for the life of the process — see
 /// `NEW_WINDOW_LABEL_PREFIX`.
 static WINDOW_SEQ: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
@@ -4315,6 +4389,62 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(live.contains(".plugin(navigation_pin())"));
     }
 
+    /// WebView2 sends a refused navigation's request anyway, so on Windows the
+    /// request pin must refuse every web request off the app's origins, in any
+    /// form a page can issue one, while leaving local schemes alone.
+    #[test]
+    fn the_request_pin_refuses_web_requests_off_the_app_origins() {
+        let url = |text: &str| tauri::Url::parse(text).expect("test URL parses");
+        let windows = [url("http://tauri.localhost"), url("http://ipc.localhost")];
+        for allowed in [
+            "http://tauri.localhost/viewer.html",
+            "http://tauri.localhost/viewer.html?nav=control",
+            "http://ipc.localhost/plugin%3Aevent%7Clisten",
+            "",
+            "blob:http://tauri.localhost/2a7c1f80-5d1e-4b7e-9c55-8d1f3b0a6e21",
+        ] {
+            assert!(is_app_request(allowed, &windows), "{allowed}");
+        }
+        for refused in [
+            "http://127.0.0.1:64912/nav-href?leak=1",
+            "https://attacker.example/?leak=1",
+            "ws://attacker.example/socket",
+            "wss://attacker.example/socket",
+            "http://tauri.localhost.attacker.example/",
+            "http://ipc.localhost:8080/",
+            "https://tauri.localhost/viewer.html",
+            "not a uri",
+            // On Windows a hosted file: URI is a UNC path: an SMB connection to
+            // that host, which can also hand it the user's NTLM credentials.
+            "file://attacker.example/share/x",
+            "file:///C:/Windows/win.ini",
+            "ftp://attacker.example/x",
+            "chrome-extension://abcdefghijklmnop/x",
+        ] {
+            assert!(!is_app_request(refused, &windows), "{refused}");
+        }
+        assert!(is_app_request("about:blank", &windows));
+        assert_eq!(origin_for_log("http://127.0.0.1:64912/nav?leak=secret"), "http://127.0.0.1");
+        assert!(!origin_for_log("https://attacker.example/?leak=secret").contains("secret"));
+    }
+
+    /// The request pin must admit every origin the CSP lets the page connect to,
+    /// or the bridge's own IPC fetches would be refused on Windows.
+    #[test]
+    fn the_request_pin_admits_what_the_csp_connects_to() {
+        let conf: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(include_str!("../tauri.conf.json"))
+            .expect("tauri.conf.json parses");
+        let connect = conf["app"]["security"]["csp"]["connect-src"].as_str().expect("connect-src");
+        let origins = app_request_origins();
+        for source in connect.split_whitespace().filter(|s| s.starts_with("http")) {
+            let origin = tauri::Url::parse(source).expect("connect-src origin parses");
+            assert!(origins.contains(&origin), "{source} is in connect-src but not admitted");
+        }
+        let source = include_str!("lib.rs");
+        let live = &source[..source.find("#[cfg(test)]\nmod tests").expect("tests module")];
+        assert!(live.contains(".on_webview_ready(") && live.contains("install_request_pin(&_webview)"));
+    }
+
     // -- Unsaved changes are not discarded without asking -------------------
 
     /// The per-window decision. A window with dirty databases must not close on