Repository navigation
Description
Goal
Make Scallion Network a usable, opt-in, general-purpose privacy transport built over independent c0mpute peers, rather than just the route planner in #383 and bootstrap control in #384. Preserve legal service-level requirements; do not use this feature to circumvent export controls, sanctions, or mandated identity checks for regulated compute.
Implementation slices
- Protocol & threat model: source/destination unlinkability goals, guard pinning, operator trust boundaries, traffic correlation, active adversary, malicious exits, DNS/SNI leaks, replay/downgrade protection, Tor-like limitations. Reviewed and clearly versioned before data-plane design.
- Independent peer directory: signed peer capabilities, declared / verified operator diversity, guard/middle/exit roles, fixed rate and resource limits, explicit opt-in exit policy, no global coordinator.
- Authenticated encrypted 3-hop circuit establishment, e.g. vetted crypto construction with forward secrecy and no bespoke ciphers. Prove each hop sees only previous/next hop, and only exit sees target destination. Integrate with existing libp2p Noise/RPC without confusing NAT relays and onion circuits.
- Multiplexed bidirectional streams with bounded flow control, per-hop per-circuit memory/time quotas, anti-replay, graceful shutdown and no-open-proxy-by-default.
- Client interface: local SOCKS5 interface restricted to loopback, opt-in proxy config, explicit DNS behavior, fail-closed when no eligible path, and leakage tests. TUN/VPN support is a separate milestone after SOCKS5 proves safe.
- Path planner: integrate feat: Scallion Network — privacy-aware three-hop route planning and sticky sessions #383 into live measurements with stale/fraud-aware sampling, stable guard, independent operator/ASN constraints, choose near-fastest candidate, never only the fastest node at the expense of safety.
- Session lifecycle: rotate new circuits while preserving existing TCP streams, SSH/HQTerm/HQSH, WebSockets and inference streams; idempotent GPU-job resume tokens; no forced changes to live exit IP.
- Exit node: explicit operator consent, destination/port policy, private/loopback address denial, SSRF and DNS rebinding controls, resource caps, abuse reporting, separation from default compute workers. Compliance checks remain at required service boundaries.
- Portable CLI and API:
c0mpute scallion start/status/stop, later PWA/desktop, route diagnostics; no false privacy guarantees. - Multi-node integration, leak and chaos tests: localhost, NAT, remote independent operators, circuit loss, guard loss, tampering, malicious advert, DNS leak, replay, resource-exhaustion, stream stress and teardown. Benchmark against direct and established anonymizing networks.
- Independent security assessment / remediation, threat-model publication, opt-in alpha, staged canary, signed cross-platform release and live end-to-end verification. Do not advertise this as a production anonymous VPN until the review and tests pass.
Acceptance
A user running a locally bound proxy on Node A can browse a permitted destination through independent guards/middles/exits, with layered encryption, no direct fallback, no unexpected DNS/IP leak, and an established connection that remains alive while new streams rotate onto a different eligible path. A compute customer can also submit an otherwise-permitted GPU inference job to a consenting worker via this channel without relying on c0mpute.com as a coordinator. Regulated service-level compliance remains independently enforced.
Source PRs
- feat: Scallion Network — privacy-aware three-hop route planning and sticky sessions #383: route ranking, candidate diversity, CircuitLeases (foundation only)
- feat(scallion): community-owned P2P bootstrap with no default HTTP check-in #384: community-only discovery and no default HTTP bootstrap (foundation only)
Activity
ralyodio commentedon Nov 15, 2026
Scallion delivery checkpoint
8b943a1de8aa7db9753d1929ce6cfcc6517af312): route-ranking and sticky-session primitive. Full Rust workspace build/tests and security scans passed.9e59f2cebcac1c26254d51590e0b9c8efce20d17): community-owned peer bootstrap without mandatory HTTP request to c0mpute.com. Full Rust workspace build/tests and security scans passed.Production claim: No live Scallion anonymity service exists yet. Libp2p NAT relays are not onion circuits, and permissionless peer membership does not bypass regulated-service compliance. Track actual release artifacts and independent security assessment before marketing it as live.
ralyodio commentedon Nov 15, 2026
Additional client compatibility: OpenVPN Connect
Tracked as #389: standard OpenVPN client support via an opt-in OpenVPN-protocol entry gateway and
.ovpnprofile, after encrypted multihop Scallion transport is complete and audited. An OpenVPN Connect app cannot speak libp2p or Scallion circuits natively. The entry gateway necessarily sees the client's IP, and ordinary OpenVPN connections do not magically preserve arbitrary TCP sockets when the exit/circuit rotates. No OpenVPN gateway is currently deployed.Status update: #383, #384 and #388 are merged. #387 merged to master to initiate the guarded v0.3.77 release, but publication must still be confirmed via successful tag, signed platform assets and public downloads. The core functionality necessary for a real Scallion VPN remains open in #386.
ralyodio commentedon Nov 15, 2026
Client interoperability milestone: PR #390 introduces independent native/OpenVPN mode selection, capability gates, an OpenVPN Connect profile formatter (including required
setenv CLIENT_CERT 0for password-only profiles), and CLI diagnostics. No live tunnel / VPN server / leak-free data plane exists; it must remain NOT READY until those are implemented, tested, and reviewed. Issue #391 tracks a separate blocker: dev2 deployments fail because GitHub runners cannot connect over SSH port 22, so a GitHub release/merge does not prove c0mpute.com was deployed. Keep #386 open until real multi-hop E2E tests and production security review are complete.ralyodio commentedon Nov 17, 2026
Engineering progress: PR #395 adds an isolated experimental three-layer X25519/HKDF/AES-256-GCM frame primitive with one-hop decryption, tamper/replay checks, explicit sequence counters, strict size bounds and unit tests. Full Rust CI is still running; security scans have passed. This is NOT yet connected to libp2p forwarding and lacks authenticated ephemeral relay handshakes/forward secrecy, SOCKS5/TUN, DNS leak prevention, operating exits or a live OpenVPN entry. Do not market it as a functional VPN. PR #392 prepares signed v0.3.78 for the earlier native/OpenVPN mode diagnostics, pending Rust test completion.