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ThreatCrush Security Scan14 finding(s) HIGH/CRITICAL: 2 | MEDIUM: 8 | LOW: 4
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…epting host egress guard
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Distributed container hosting: default-deny unguarded egress
c0mpute already has distributed container hosting with
c0mpute apps(DIP-0031,docs/apps.md): signed app records, Docker images, three-replica placement, primary/standby failover, snapshots, custom domains, CLI, and MCP tools. This PR hardens an existing default that makes those capabilities risky on unprivileged Docker workers.Problem
[apps] require_egress_guardcurrently defaults tofalse. If the iptables-based egress guard cannot be installed, the container can run on Docker's default bridge and potentially reach the node host, LAN and cloud metadata endpoints. The documentation explicitly acknowledges this exposure.Change
require_egress_guard = true. ExistingApps::startalready refuses to run on an unprotected non-root host, andruntime::network_forerrors rather than selecting Docker's default bridge when required.egress_guarddefault remainstrue.require_egress_guard = falseconfigurations remain opt-outs (with security consequences).Test
cargo test -p c0mpute-core --lockedand full workspace Rust/security CI.Operator notice / availability change
This is a security-sensitive behavior change: non-root hosts without an installed guard may no longer run containers, reducing capacity. Operators must provision protected nodes rather than silently weakening isolation. The guard remains IPv4-only; comprehensive IPv6, tenant isolation, adversarial failover and production container-hardening tests remain open.
Scope
This hardens existing hosting; it does not launch a new hosting marketplace, establish production multi-host failover, or complete the Scallion VPN. Do not merge if tests fail. Tracks distributed hosting readiness and Scallion issue #386.