security: harden Redis ACL validation safety - #19
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On 2026-09-18, production Redis was accidentally FLUSHALL'd during ad hoc redis-exporter ACL negative testing: Redis's `default` user was enabled with nopass, so a connection was already authenticated as `default` the instant it opened; an explicit AUTH to a named identity with the wrong password failed but did not deauthenticate the connection, and subsequent commands -- including FLUSHALL -- executed with default's unrestricted permissions instead of failing. Adds scripts/redis_acl_safety.py, a small framework that makes this failure class structurally impossible for any caller that uses it: explicit, independently-reverified environment classification (DISPOSABLE requires a live nonce round-trip, never inferred from a hostname/port/empty-env-var; UNKNOWN is treated at least as strictly as PRODUCTION everywhere); every authenticated session is a brand-new connection that is closed unconditionally on any AUTH failure before a second command can reach the wire; identity is asserted via ACL WHOAMI before any validation command runs, with no warning-only fallback; a narrow production command allowlist plus a hard dangerous-command denylist (FLUSHALL, FLUSHDB, SHUTDOWN, DEBUG, CONFIG SET, ACL mutations, MIGRATE/RESTORE/SWAPDB/REPLICAOF/SLAVEOF, ...); and no public method that exposes the underlying redis-py client. tests/test_redis_acl_safety.py reproduces the actual incident sequence against a genuinely disposable Redis instance (started fresh via Docker for the test session, mirroring tests/_redis_integration_guard.py's existing no-implicit-default / no-production-port conventions), proves this framework survives it, and covers command-gate parsing (case, bytes, subcommand splitting), identity mismatch, authentication failure shapes, disposable-only destructive proof via DisposableNegativeTestGate, unknown-environment strictness, and the raw-client bypass surface. 86 tests, all passing; full existing suite unaffected (475 passed, 23 skipped, 0 failed). No production Redis was touched to build or test this. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
scripts/redis_acl_safety.py, a framework that structurally prevents the failure class behind the 2026-09-18 production Redis FLUSHALL incident: explicit, independently-reverified environment classification (DISPOSABLE/PRODUCTION/UNKNOWN), fresh-connection-per-identity with unconditional close on any AUTH failure, hard identity assertion viaACL WHOAMI, a narrow production command allowlist plus a dangerous-command denylist, and no public accessor for the underlying redis-py client.tests/test_redis_acl_safety.py, which reproduces the actual incident sequence (failed AUTH leaving a connection authenticated asdefault) against a genuinely disposable Redis instance, and covers command-gate parsing, identity mismatch, authentication-failure shapes, disposable-only destructive proof, unknown-environment strictness, and the raw-client bypass surface.Test plan
pytest -q tests/test_redis_acl_safety.py— 86 passed, 0 failed🤖 Generated with Claude Code