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…l encrypted hop frames
ThreatCrush Security Scan14 finding(s) HIGH/CRITICAL: 2 | MEDIUM: 8 | LOW: 4
Snippets are redacted; ThreatCrush never prints matched credential material. |
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Experimental authenticated hop-frame primitive — not yet a VPN
Deliver a first testable cryptographic data-plane building block after route planner #383 / bootstrap #384 / exit admission #388 / optional client selection #390.
Code
c0mpute_net::scallion_framesprovides:Cargo.lock, crate dependencies, public module, and detailed limitations atdocs/protocol/scallion-frames.md.Run
IMPORTANT — Not security-audited; no live network yet
This change does not bind relay X25519 keys to authenticated libp2p identities, provide ephemeral-ephemeral authenticated handshake/forward secrecy, deliver frames on P2P streams, expose SOCKS5/TUN or OpenVPN server, protect DNS, operate exit nodes, or provide real anonymity. Long-lived relay keys compromise recorded frames; a single ordered stream cannot tolerate packet reordering or resume counters after crash. It is deliberately not wired to user traffic or public listeners.
Requires a fully reviewed authenticated forward-secret handshake, stream mux, per-connection resource controls, adversarial E2E and independently assessed security design before anything resembling a public VPN can be enabled. Tracks #386 and #389.
Merge only after full required Rust/security CI is green and module remains inaccessible as a live service. No evasion of export controls, sanctions or mandated service-level KYC.